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Abstract
Studies in European Integration and Institutional Change
Danko Tarabar
This dissertation is a collection of empirical essays studying the drivers of institutional change 
and the effects of economic and political integration across countries, with a special focus 
on the European setting. Chapter 2 examines the drivers of market-institutional change 
within transition countries, the early post-communist economies undergoing an economic 
system switch from socialism to a market order in the immediate aftermath of communism’s 
collapse, between 1989 and 2001. I hypothesize that the effectiveness of political liberaliza-
tion, a factor identified to be the major driver of economic reform in transition countries, 
is conditional on the underlying cultural attitudes that influence how voters may legitimize 
particular institutional arrangements. By considering the interaction term between culture 
and democracy, I disaggregate the marginal effect of democracy on market reform adoption 
by the cultural environment from which democracy emerged. I find that in societies that 
foster individualistic and politically egalitarian attitudes, the positive effect of democracy 
on reforms is amplified. Chapter 3 considers the impact of EU integration on institutional 
quality in a set of European countries between 1970 and 2010. EU integration can promote 
institutional improvement via at least two mechanisms: the pre-membership accession pro-
cess, during which countries are mandated to implement reforms as a condition for joining, 
and the membership stage, in which new member states are ushered in a common market of 
unrestricted mobility. On the latter, it is argued that the presence of the common market 
encourages competition between members in adopting better policies and institutions with 
the aim of attracting capital and labor or risk their exit. The main finding is that integration 
with the EU often has a statistically negligible impact on institutional improvement, and 
that when the impact is significant, it is generally modest. Chapter 4 considers how the 
intensity of EU member countries’ economic activity with the EU’s common market along 
with their institutional conformity with EU law relate to entrepreneurial activity, measured 
by the prevalence of microfirms and the rate of self-employment between 2004 and 2012. It 
is shown that the deepening of economic and political integration with the EU stimulates 
entrepreneurial activity in member countries by expanding opportunities for specialization, 
promoting a healthy competitive environment, and reducing transaction costs of operating 
a business. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of this dissertation and offers concluding 
remarks.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The costs and benefits of European integration have re-entered policy spotlight in recent
years with the ongoing Eurozone crisis and the 2016 “Brexit” referendum. Since its founding
as a free trade area at the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the European Union (EU) evolved over
six decades and several subsequent enlargements into a political and economic supranational
union, in which its 28 member states and over 500 million people share common foreign,
trade, and (to a large extent) monetary policies; also, legislative and adjudicative institutions,
as well as the largest common market in the world in which goods, services, capital, and
labor flow freely.
The welfare consequences of political and economic integration are well-known in the
empirical economics literature. For example, increases in intensity of cross-national trade
and capital flows, important “symptoms” of globalization, were found to promote economic
growth across countries and over time (Dreher, 2006). In a similar vein, a growing body of
literature documents the positive effect of joining the EU’s common market on income levels
and growth among European countries (e.g., Campos et al., 2014; Crespo Cuaresma et al.,
2008; Badinger, 2005).
Joining EU also entails an institutional dimension of integration, under which mem-
ber states become a part of a political structure resembling market-preserving federalism
(Weingast, 1995), characterized by a clear separation of federal and sub-federal governments,
whereby the lower layers of government maintain primary responsibility over own economies
2and coexist within a common market of unrestricted mobility. Public finance literature sug-
gests that such a political structure ensures that sub-federal “jurisdictions” (i.e., member
states) compete for economic activity by providing bundles of better policies and institutions
or risk the “exit” of capital and labor (Tiebout, 1956).
In this dissertation, I examine the factors contributing to European institutional change
over time and the economic effects of EU integration. Chapter 2 begins with transition
countries, a group of early post-communist economies located in Eastern Europe (including
a small number in Central Asia), and investigates the role of culture as a potential deter-
minant of their market-institutional reform, a necessary condition for EU membership, in
the immediate aftermath of communism’s collapse. Transition countries differed widely in
the extent to which they implemented market reforms. I examine an unbalanced panel of
up to 21 transition countries over the period 1989-2001 and estimate the relationship be-
tween different cultural attitudes based on Hofstede (1980); Hofstede and Hofstede (2001)
typologies and transition countries’ reform efforts. I report that a sense of individualism
and intolerance for unequal dispersion of power within societies are robustly associated with
greater market reform efforts. Only limited evidence exists for the influence of other cultural
dimensions.
In Chapter 3, jointly authored with Andrew Young, we take the long-run view of EU
integration and ask how might integration with the EU affect institutional quality in a
wide sample of European countries between 1970 and 2010. The European Union may
promote reforms to policies and institutions through at least two distinct mechanisms. First,
accession to the EU requires applicant countries to undertake reforms. Second, the EU
common market may promote Tiebout jurisdictional competition. We empirically evaluate
these two mechanisms using an unbalanced panel of up to 45 European countries during
1970-2010 and find that relationships between EU accession/membership and measures of
policies/institutions are often statistically insignificant. Furthermore, when the estimated
effects are statistically significant they are generally modest.
Chapter 4 explores entrepreneurial activity as a potential channel through which EU
integration may promote economic prosperity within member states. Recent literature high-
lights the role of economic integration in promoting the resurgence of entrepreneurship across
3the world. This chapter empirically tests the link between regional integration and en-
trepreneurial activity, measured as the prevalence of micro firms between 1 and 9 employees
in size, in an unbalanced panel of 24 European Union countries observed between 2004 and
2012. Evidence from fixed effects regressions report that, all else equal, micro firms per labor
levels mostly increase in the level of EU economic and political integration. The finding is
robust to a number of control variables and alternative proxies for entrepreneurship.
The central contribution of this dissertation is three-fold. First, it accounts for the
cultural narrative of institutional change among transition economies of Eastern Europe and
Central Asia. I show that the effectiveness of democratization on the adoption of market
reforms was conditional on the underlying culture from which democracy emerged. In that
respect, I argue that culture provides for an important lens through which the impact of
political liberalization on various socio-economic outcomes can be better understood and
predicted.
Second, jointly with Andrew Young, I find only small effects of EU membership and ac-
cession on institutional improvement in member and aspirant countries. Moreover, the effects
of the two mechanisms of EU integration diverged based on which dimensions of institutions
we observe. While membership encouraged convergence in institutions of economic freedom
via Tiebout competition, the process of accession promoted openness and cross-border eco-
nomic flows. In that respect, the benefits of EU integration, however modest, clarify one
potential channel through which the EU fosters an institutional environment conducive to
economic growth.
Lastly, I present preliminary evidence speaking to the conjecture that cross-country eco-
nomic and political integration stimulate entrepreneurial activity, an important correlate of
economic progress. Observing integration through the lens of European regional cooperation
and employing a novel index of EU integration, I argue that intra-EU flows of goods, services,
and people, as well as greater institutional conformity with the common market laws and
regulations, created an environment conducive to entrepreneurial learning, innovation, and
intentions. Evidence suggests that one way through which the EU can promote growth lies
in deepening the scope of member countries’ reliance on the common market and promoting
an institutional environment of fair competition and lower transaction costs of operating a
4business.
5Chapter 2
Culture, Democracy, and Market
Reforms: Evidence from Transition
Countries
2.1 Introduction
What was the role of informal institutions in formal institutional change within transition
countries? Can differences in market reform be attributed to differences in culture? This
chapter empirically investigates the role of culture in the early experiences of post-socialist
transition characterized by dismantling of central planning and institutional convergence
towards free markets and private property.
The development experience of transition economies differed from that of many other de-
veloping countries in that it involved a simultaneous liberalization of both the economy and
the political system. The disintegration of the Soviet Union provided economists with un-
precedented insights into the problems involved with transitioning from command structures
to markets. Although the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former
Soviet Union (FSU) began their transition from similar institutional structures, they ended
up with outcomes that differed, sometimes drastically so. Today, the CEEs have largely
joined the ranks of the advanced market economies in the European Union. Alternatively,
6many FSU and some Balkan countries still lack substantive political and economic freedoms
(see, e.g., reports by Fraser Institute and Freedom House).
Transition reforms generally included regulatory and legislative efforts to liberalize prices,
wages, finances, foreign exchange, trade, and property laws (see Kornai, 1992). These ef-
forts were designed to structurally transform the centralized command structures in which
virtually all aspects of economic (and political) activity were directly controlled by the sole
(communist) party in power. Hence, apart from their economic dimension, transition re-
forms were also the carriers of sweeping formal institutional change. Given the significance
of pro-market policies and institutions in improving living standards across CEE and FSU
(see, e.g., Babecky and Havranek, 2014), it remains a puzzle, then, as to why these countries
varied in the pace of reform implementation in the aftermath of communism’s collapse. This
chapter argues that reform adoption, i.e., institutional change towards an economic system
fostering free markets and private property, was partly dependent on the transition countries’
informal institutions.
We can refer to a country’s informal institutions as its culture. Following Guiso et al.
(2006), culture consists of those commonly accepted and shared conventions, values, norms
of behavior, and codes of conduct adhered to by citizens and exhibiting high inertia or per-
sistence over time.1 A growing literature suggests that culture is an important determinant
of economic development. For example, Williamson (2009) reports higher living standards in
countries that exhibit higher levels of trust, respect, individual self-determination, and obe-
dience, and that formal institutions are also beneficial in that respect if they are grounded
in these informal constraints. Guiso et al. (2003) link religiosity with preference towards
thriftiness. Closely related studies empirically document the linkage between different cul-
ture, economic performance (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2016, 2011; Alesina et al., 2015;
Tabellini, 2010; Guiso et al., 2009), and institutions (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2015;
Klasing, 2013; Licht et al., 2007).
Within the context of transition, Pejovich (2003) proposes that the formal institutions
of a market-oriented economy require an appropriate cultural undercurrent that encourages
1They define culture as “those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups
transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation” (p. 23).
7“self-interest, self-determination, self-responsibility, and free market competition” (p. 350).
Clashes between culture and formal institutions will raise the transaction costs associated
with accepting, monitoring, and enforcing of the latter (p. 351). In a similar vein, Voigt and
Engerer (2002) note that complementarity between “internal” institutions (i.e., conventions,
ethical rules, customs, private rules) and “external” institutions (i.e., state laws) will mean
that “the state has to provide fewer resources for the enforcement of its institutions” (p. 136).
In other words, where informal norms conflict with the formal institutions, enforceability and
implementation of these rules is more likely to become unsuccessful or incomplete.2
The adoption of market reforms in transition economies has attracted a great deal of
attention from economists. Yet despite a rich literature on market-institutional transition,
few empirical works have focused on the role of informal institutions as a determinant of re-
form performance. The existing research has largely focused on the linkage among reforms,
macroeconomic performance, initial conditions, and measures of various political variables
and constraints (see, e.g., Campos and Horva´th, 2012; Falcetti et al., 2006, 2002; Fidrmuc,
2003; Merlevede, 2003; Fish, 1997). More recent exceptions examine the impact of resource
and institutional endowments, religion, public support, and European Union (EU) integra-
tion (BenYishay and Grosjean, 2014; Landier et al., 2008; Di Tommaso et al., 2007; Beck
and Laeven, 2006; Kim and Pirttila¨, 2006).3
I build on these studies and provide, to my knowledge, the first direct evidence of the
relationship between specific cultural/cognitive models and the extent of market reform in
transition economies. Based on an unbalanced panel of 21 transition economies over the
1989-2001 period, I find that the cultural traits of individualism and low tolerance for an
unequal distribution of power significantly moderated the effectiveness of democratization
in promoting market reform.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 outlines related litera-
ture and the theoretical considerations on the role of informal norms in formal institutional
change. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 outline the empirical methodology and describe the data. Sec-
2For more on a relationship between the changes in formal and informal rules in the context of transition,
see Chavance (2008).
3See Grosjean (2011) and Dimitrova-Grajzl (2007) for more on the consequences of institutional/historical
legacies in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
8tion 2.5 presents results, and section 2.6 sensitivity checks. Section 2.7 offers concluding
remarks.
2.2 Theoretical Considerations
Economists agree that institutions matter, but the profession has only recently begun to
unbundle the “black box” of informal institutions—the unwritten and privately enforced
norms and constraints that shape repeated human interaction. As North (1992) observed
at the time, “ideology plays no role in neoclassical economic theory” (p. 477). However,
at least since the seminal work of Weber et al. (1930), social scientists have recognized the
importance of informal institutions in accounting for the differences in economic outcomes.
More recent empirical studies show that diverse informal institutions such as social capital
(Tabellini, 2010; Guiso et al., 2004; Zak and Knack, 2001; Knack and Keefer, 1997), religion
(Bjørnskov and Me´on, 2013; Guiso et al., 2006; McCleary and Barro, 2003), and individualism
(Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2016, 2015, 2011; Klasing, 2013; Licht et al., 2007) matter for
institutional and economic performance.4
Social scientists generally regard culture as a stable and self-perpetuating system of
shared patterns of behavior, preferences, customs, norms, and beliefs that is transmitted
primarily vertically, from parents to children. If culture is rooted in history and hence
persistent, then it determines socio-economic development more so than the other way around
(Beugelsdijk et al., 2015, p. 226). While in the long-run, economic and political development
certainly feed back into cultural changes, social norms developed over centuries tend to
remain “locked in” and constrain the future development of formal institutions, norms of
governance, and allocation of scarce resources (Williamson, 2000). In other words, while
simultaneity is a concern, institutional change is path-dependent, and the evolution of formal
institutions may be in large part conditional on the set of existing informal institutions.
Complementarity between informal and a proposed set of new formal institutions is
regarded as a major determinant of success in formal institutional change. Pejovich (2003)
4For an exhaustive review of literature on the interplay between culture and socio-economic outcomes,
see Roland (2015) and Alesina and Giuliano (2015).
9and Voigt and Engerer (2002) highlight the role of transaction and coordination costs of
acceptance, monitoring, and enforcement of formal institutions. Where the newly introduced
formal institutions are in conflict with existing informal ones, the magnitude of these costs
will be larger, making it more difficult for formal institutions to take root. Their findings
suggest that formal institutions that are put in place from above (or by fiat) will often
be ineffective. In a related strand of literature, Boettke et al. (2008) provide a theoretical
framework for understanding institutional path dependence, and create a new taxonomy of
institutions based on their “stickiness.” Within this framework, the success or failure of newly
introduced formal institutions will be a function of how well they map onto local knowledge,
skills, culture, and norms that spontaneously emerge from repeated life interactions.5
Apart from costs in implementing new formal institutions, the dominant cultural values
can also determine underlying worldviews and social preferences for different institutional ar-
rangements. In this context, adherence to certain cultural worldviews informs and prescribes
behaviors that legitimize corresponding sets of social relations and institutions (Rosenbaum,
2001, p. 906). According to the Grid-Group theory in cultural anthropology (Thompson
et al., 1990), an individualistic mindset takes life as a net-positive game and cultivates
beliefs that discrepancies between material needs and scarcity can be overcome through in-
dividual efforts rather than central planning.6 In that respect, an individualistic mindset
may provide for a fertile soil for the introduction of private property rights and markets as
the “institutionalized form of the invisible hand” (Rosenbaum, 2001, p. 900). An egalitarian
way of life teaches that resource redistribution is a zero-sum game; total amount of available
resources cannot be increased, so individual efforts aimed at personal gains necessarily cre-
ate inequalities and are hence unwelcome, whereas a hierarchical mindset presupposes that
needs and resources must be managed top-down (by experts and hierarchical organizations)
without interference from individual decision-making (p. 900).
Based on the foregoing considerations, this paper conjectures that historically rooted
cultural attributes played a role in determining the extent of transition market reform. Early
5For more on the interplay between formal rules, informal rules, and economic performance, see Winiecki
(2001).
6 “Grid” here refers to how individuals within a society take on different roles given their similarities or
differences in skills or abilities. “Group” refers to the degree of mutual embeddedness and bond of individuals
within a society.
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post-socialist countries exhibited significant variation in the pace of dismantling of centralized
economic structures characterized by a lack of private property, government control over all
aspects of economic activity, and little freedom of choice and exchange. One possible avenue
for exploration in this direction may lie in understanding that a sustained market-based
institutional change requires not just an introduction of new formal rules and laws, but also
acceptance of an entirely new ethos promoting as main values meritocracy, competition,
as well as acceptance of the possibility of previously unprecedented economic phenomena
such as income inequality, employment uncertainty, and hard budget constraint. Whether
market reforms will be implemented may well depend on whether policymakers anticipate
that proposed changes in the formal “rules of the game” will be welcomed or decried by
broad cross-sections of society.7
In summary, existing research stresses that successful institutional changes are largely
conditional on the proximity between the proposed formal and existing informal institutions.
If formal institutions are grounded in and compatible with local culture, they are more
likely to become commonly accepted and sustained. Given the transformative nature of
institutional change during transition, any evidence on the impact of culture on formal
institutional reform might be evident there with high clarity. Did individualistic countries
more easily develop a national consensus to undergo market transition? Did societies less
comfortable with the uncertainties of transition resist market reforms? An answer in either
direction can add to the understanding of the variation in reform performance amongst these
countries.
7Related to present arguments, North (2005) noted in a 1997 lecture to UNU-WIDER titled The Contribu-
tion of the New Institutional Economics to an Understanding of the Transition Problem: “If the institutional
matrices of economies did not result in path dependence (that is, were not characterized by complementar-
ities, economies of scope, and network externalities) and if instrumental rationality characterized the way
choices were made, then institutions would not matter, and overnight the policy maker could impose efficient
rules upon an economy and overnight alter its direction to a productive economy.” Further, “The Eastern
European demise of communism in 1989 reflected a collapse of the perceived legitimacy of the existing belief
system and consequent weakening of the supporting organizations. The result was the destruction of most of
the formal institutional framework, but the survival of many of the informal constraints. Policy makers were
confronted not only with restructuring an entire society, but also with the blunt instrument that is inherent
in policy changes that can only alter the formal rules but cannot alter the accompanying norms and even
have had only limited success in inducing enforcement of policies” (p. 16).
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2.3 Empirical Framework
The empirical analysis draws from an unbalanced panel of 21 transition countries (N =
21) observed over the time period 1989-2001 (T = 13).8 The first decade of transition, on
which this paper primarily focuses, was marked by a gradual dismantlement of command
economic structures through liberalization of the economy and privatization of state-owned
enterprises. Following the loosening of the political grip by central communist parties in
and around 1989, the nations behind the Iron Curtain gained the rights of self-governance
and multi-party pluralism that allowed for participation of reform-minded interests in the
political arena. The implementation of structural reforms during this period and later on
has been linked to long-run increases in living standards and, later on, the EU accession of
many former socialist states.9
In addition to economic reforms, the political transition during the 1990s brought about
the abolishment of the one-party system as well as the emergence of political interests whose
survival became contingent on conforming to the preferences, worldviews, and ideology of the
voters. Given the historical and cultural diversities of transition countries, one might expect
that voter preferences likewise differed between them. Indeed, in an early comparative study
on transition performance, Fish (1997) finds that the extent of reforms at the end of 1995
was significantly influenced by the outcome of the first post-communist elections. As reform
adoption is ultimately the matter of policy, i.e., political will and government efforts, the
interplay between the democratic process and voter characteristics/preferences may play an
important role in explaining the cross-national variation in reform adoption.
A society’s culture can act as a potential determinant of voting choices and outcomes by
informing voters’ worldviews and preferences, and by extension, government’s reform efforts.
However, as this paper concerns with accounting for the evolution of reform paths over time,
8These countries are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Georgia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Due to data limitations, the remaining transition countries of Bosnia,
Kazakhstan, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are omitted from the analysis.
9In a meta-analysis, Babecky and Havranek (2014) review 60 empirical studies since 1996 and reaffirm the
positive effect of reforms on long-run economic growth in transition economies. Eleven transition economies
joined EU in three subsequent enlargements in 2004, 2007, and 2013, while four more are either candidates
or currently negotiating.
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then culture as a stable (or at least highly persistent) phenomenon cannot by itself explain
the within variation of reform adoption. The assumption therefore is that culture influences
reform efforts only as it participates in the political process through appropriate legisla-
tive and executive channels. Hence, the nature of political liberalization (democratization)
in transition countries may be especially consequential for its effectiveness on encouraging
market reform.
Although recent empirical literature finds mixed support for the hypothesis that democ-
racy encourages regulatory reform around the world (Amin and Djankov, 2014), in the case
of transition countries the linkage between democratization and market reform is considered
as robustly positive (Fidrmuc, 2003). Yet as Fidrmuc (2003) notes, “one can only speculate
why democracy encourages liberalization” (p. 601).10 The underlying mechanism in the re-
lationship between democracy and market reforms remains not fully understood, especially
in light of the ambiguous effect of democracy on economic development (Barro, 1996).
At the very least, democracy works to enhance government accountability and to fa-
cilitate monitoring of government actions by citizens. However, this description says little
about possible implications of the establishment of democratic institutions vis-a`-vis reform
adoption. The imposition of checks and balances on the executive branch and the predomi-
nance of the legislature in guiding policy is not likely to be sufficient in predicting a country’s
reform stance. Instead, one might be interested in the actual characteristics of the electorate
that does the voting and monitoring; conditional on these characteristics, democratization
may lead to different reform outcomes. This paper posits that one way to lend further
context to democracy may lie in its interplay with informal institutions; i.e., that the effec-
tiveness of democratization is a function of the underlying culture operationalized by said
democratization.
Taking culture into account, democratization allows for voter preferences to marginally
10Fidrmuc (2003) further writes: “Hence, there are merits to simultaneous democratization and
liberalization—democracy facilitates liberalization, which, in turn, improves growth performance. This is
an important lesson for those transition economies that remain autocratic (e.g., China, Belarus, until re-
cently, Serbia), those that may now be reversing the initial democratization (e.g., Russia under president
Putin) in the hope of improving economic performance, as well as developing countries that may contemplate
introducing greater democracy” (p. 602). Yet even after initially becoming democracies, some transition
countries (e.g., Balkans) saw strong performance of anti-reform minded political parties in their respective
parliaments, contributing to sluggish reform performance.
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“impose” themselves on policymaking by forcing the ruling elites to internalize the expected
electoral costs of reform choices. Democratization in cultural environments more forthcom-
ing of the changes brought about by market transition could be expected to speed up the
adoption of market reforms. Conversely, democratization in environments hostile to market
reforms may provide a disincentive for the government to introduce reforms. In that sense, if
culture is to be considered as a stable societal characteristic over shorter periods, the impact
of culture on reform efforts can only be observable indirectly, through its moderating effect
on the process of democratization.
To test the above hypothesis, I estimate the following two econometric models:
Ri,t = β1Democi,t + β2Cultd,i + β3Democi,t × Cultd,i + θX ′ + β0 + νi + ui,t, (2.1)
Ri,t = ρRi,t−1 + β1Democi,t + β2Cultd,i + β3Democi,t × Cultd,i + θX ′ + β0 + ui,t, (2.2)
where i and t index country and year respectively, R denotes reforms, Cult is a time-invariant
cultural dimension d in country i, Democ is a variable capturing the level of democracy, X
is the vector of controls, and u is the error term. Equation (2.1) follows the static panel
specification that specifies the term ν as both the country-specific intercept (fixed effect)
and as the error term (random effect). To check for robustness, Equation (2.2) introduces
persistence by allowing for present reform level to be influenced by past efforts. Additionally,
the presence of the lagged dependent variable serves to partially absorb the effects of other
unobserved heterogeneity.
The rationale for the above specification is as follows. First, because culture is relatively
stable (Roland, 2004), it cannot by itself influence reforms over time. The interaction with
time-varying democracy variable extracts culture from the country fixed effect and indirectly
lends it within-country variation, making it suitable for longitudinal analysis. Second, cul-
tural attitudes as societal preferences cannot influence policy without active participation in
the political process. In that respect, democracy acts as a plausible transmission channel for
culture, whereby each step towards democratic consolidation brings the government closer
to the electorate. In other words, if culture matters, it should matter more in democracies.11
11For example, Landier et al. (2008) also interact Polity IV with public opinions to tease out the causal
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Democracy is thus contextualized by the cultural environment from which it emerged. If
a cultural characteristic does moderate the effectiveness of democracy on reforms, then the
coefficient of the interaction term of interest should be significant at statistically usual levels.
The full marginal impact of democracy is given by the cross-partial derivative:
∂Ri,t
∂Democi,t
= β1 + β3Cultd,i. (2.3)
In models with interaction terms the parameter estimates of interacted variables no longer
represent unconditional marginal effects and the standard errors of each constituent term
are of little individual interest. Instead, the standard error of interest of the marginal effect
in Equation (2.3) is given by:12
σˆ ∂R
∂Democ
=
√
var(βˆ1) + Cult2var(βˆ3) + 2Cult× cov(βˆ1βˆ3). (2.4)
The estimated analytical standard errors given by Equation (2.4) are then used to con-
struct 90 and 95 percent confidence bands around the estimated average marginal effect
(2.3). The marginal effects plots are given in the appendix.
To more thoroughly address the empirical question, two sets of panel estimators are
employed: static (Equation 2.1) and dynamic (autoregressive) (Equation 2.2), which allows
for checking the robustness of results of Equation (2.1) once past reform efforts are accounted
for. The dynamic model is estimated using the linear generalized method of moments (system
GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) (AB) and Blundell and Bond
(1998) (BB).13 The static panel models are fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE), and the
mixed effects (ME) estimator, which contains both fixed and random effects.14
Different estimators come with different costs and benefits in examining longitudinal
data. The FE model abstracts from all observed and unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity
effect of opinions on economic outcomes.
12See Brambor et al. (2006) for a detailed discussion on the use of interaction terms in econometric analysis.
13In the presence of a lagged dependent variable as a regressor, the standard panel estimators are no
longer consistent and introduce the dynamic panel bias, also known as the Nickell (1981) bias. The AB/BB
estimator allows for consistent estimation in the presence of a lagged dependent variable.
14In the context of these models, fixed effects refer to the standard regression coefficients, while random
effects imply either random intercepts or random slopes, or both.
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across countries (e.g., colonial and legal origins, historical circumstances, religion, ethnolin-
guistic fractionalization, etc.) and focuses on explaining only the variation within countries
over time.15 Alternatively, the RE model incorporates information also from between-country
differences, allowing for a consistent estimation of both time variant and invariant parameters
if the conditional mean of RE disturbances given regressors is not significantly different from
zero. Using the Hausman specification test, the two models are found to produce sufficiently
similar estimates so that the use of RE is preferable to FE.16
The ME are a more elaborate class of RE models. In addition to taking into account
the information from both within and between variation, they also allow for a more flexible
modeling of the random component of the model. In this case, the random effect for each
country is specified as a function of time whereby a random trend slope is assigned to each
country. This specification allows for a more realistic assumption that countries experience
different individual time trends.17
2.4 Data
2.4.1 The Dependent Variable
The extent of transition market reform is captured by newly developed structural reform
indices (Campos and Horva´th, 2012). The Campos and Horva´th (CH) indices, measured on
a 0-100 scale (originally 0-1) with higher values denoting greater reform efforts, represent a
methodological improvement over the standard transition indicator developed by the Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Although the use of the EBRD
indicator in empirical research has been widespread, this indicator has also been subject
to criticism insofar as it represents the EBRD’s subjective evaluation of countries’ progress
in reforms as compared against the reference point of a hypothetical industrialized market
15The AB / BB estimator similarly controls for time-invariant country characteristics by eliminating fixed
effects using the Helmert transformation.
16Across all estimated specifications the Hausman test consistently fails to reject the null hypothesis of no
systematic difference between fixed and random effects (p-values between 0.22 and 0.90).
17Although parameter estimates are largely robust to the choice of estimator, the ME model serves as the
preferred method used in constructing the conditional marginal effect plots.
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economy.18
The CH indices represent narrower and more objective metrics for reforms that take into
account an array of liberalizing policies under the direct purview of the state; in that respect,
they rely not on subjective judgments but on clearly delineated reform inputs, i.e., on what
the state has actually done (see appendix for the list of underlying policies).19 Unlike the
EBRD indicator that describes reform adoption as a smooth process, the CH indices describe
reform adoption with much greater unevenness, providing for a better approximation of
reality.20
The three original CH subindices gauge reform progress in the areas of internal (price
and wage), external (trade and openness), and ownership (privatization) liberalization. Un-
weighted average of the three areas was calculated to provide a total measure for market
reform and a composite proxy for market-institutional change. Calculated this way, the aver-
age CH index mean and standard deviation from the largest regression subsample equal 47.19
and 25.43, respectively. The average CH index (Figure 2.1) directly relates to the degree of
dismantlement of central planning and the economy’s conversion to a market-based resource
allocation. Figure ?? below depicts the relationship between real GDP growth rates and the
level of average CH index for the sample in question. The simple scatter plot suggests that
the relationship is unambiguously positive.
2.4.2 Cultural Variables
The specific mechanism through which informal institutions affect reforms depends on which
aspect of culture we observe. Culture, unlike polled opinions, ought to be gauged in terms of
broader cognitive models that remain relatively invariant to the influences of different socio-
economic factors over shorter periods. To this end, I use the highly aggregated measures
18The EBRD index measures reform progress in six different areas of reform as measured against the
standards of advanced industrialized economies. The six areas are: large and small scale privatization,
governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and forex system, and competition policy.
19To minimize measurement error, Campos and Horva´th suggest that reform inputs should be separated
from reform outcomes because they may come as a result of things other than the implemented reform policies
(e.g., tariff levels and trade openness should not enter the calculation of external liberalization reform index
together).
20For more on the relative benefits of using the CH indices and the underlying methodology, see Campos
and Horva´th (2012) and Campos and Horva´th (2009) for the working paper version.
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of culture based on Hofstede and Hofstede (2001); Hofstede (1980) cultural dimensions.21
These dimensions identify common cultural strands that permeate all societies and classify
their values into six mutually exclusive aspects of collective mentality: (i) individualism vs.
collectivism, (ii) power distance, (iii) uncertainty avoidance, (iv) indulgence vs. restraint,
(v) long-term orientation, and (vi) masculinity vs. femininity.
Hofstede’s original research, since updated and greatly expanded, used factor analysis on
survey responses from interviews with thousands of IBM employees in 30 countries during
late 1960s and early 1970s to construct aggregated scores of cultural values and attitudes.
Although not without criticism, Hofstede typologies “constitute by far the most used and
cited cultural framework in international business, management, and applied psychology”
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2015, p. 907).22 In economics literature, Hofstede dimensions have
been used in many empirical works, such as those by Gorodnichenko and Roland (2015,
2011), Klasing (2013), and Licht et al. (2007, 2005), among others.
In order to ascertain the validity and stability of Hofstede cultural scores, Beugelsdijk
et al. (2015) use World Values Survey (WVS) data collected between 1981 and 2008 in order
to replicate five of the six cultural dimensions (excluding masculinity vs. femininity) across
two non-overlapping generational cohorts born, on average, in 1941 and 1971, covering over
340,000 persons born between 1902 and 1958 (cohort 1) and after 1958 (cohort 2). Using
correlation analysis, factor analysis, and reliability analysis, the authors reaffirm the validity
of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions noting that “Hofstede data...is as relevant now as it was
when his work was first published” (p. 224), and that while some intergenerational cultural
change can be observed within countries, relative cultural distances between countries remain
overall stable over time.
With the exception of data on long-term orientation (for which more data points are
available from Hofstede et al. (2010), this paper uses the Beugelsdijk et al. (2015) replicated
21Although some scholars find that traits relating to individuals’ preferences towards the role of the state
in the economy, honesty, and youth’s trust in the government can be attributed to different legacies (or
varieties) of socialist regimes (see Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2007; Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon, 2010;
Ariely et al., 2015), Roland (2004) suggests that the strong inertia of culture (in the form of overarching
national values, beliefs, and ideological commitments) exerts a long-run persistent effect on the establishment
and sustainability of political institutions.
22Other prominent data sets on aggregated cultural values are likewise available (e.g., Schwartz, 1994),
but not used here due to data constraints.
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Hofstede scores in the empirical analysis in order to account for a broader cross-section of
society, as well as to take advantage of a higher number of observations.23 To that end,
the simple average of the replicated Hofstede values across the two cohorts is taken as the
measure for the overall country culture score.
Within Hofstede framework, culture represents “mental programming” of a nation that
takes decades to change (Hofstede et al., 2010). Individualism here refers to a culture of
personal responsibility, self-actualization, and personal freedoms. Its opposite, collectivism,
emphasizes responsibility towards a tight-knit community and calls for loyalty towards a
cohesive group while subordinating own interests to the “common good.” Individualistic
societies to a greater extent value individual over common interests, greater universalism,
encouragement of independent thinking and ideas, and personal choice.
With respect to the matters of the economy, Hofstede et al. (2010) note that “the weaker
the individualism in the citizens’ mental software the greater the likelihood of a dominating
role of the state in the economic system” (p. 125). Individualistic persons may hence be
more likely to want to prove themselves and claim reward for their efforts. A market-based
order may particularly benefit them in that it operationalizes their ambition by tying income
streams to the value of one’s marginal product, allowing access to entrepreneurial activities,
and enabling of private capital accumulation. The expectation is that more individualistic
societies will be more likely to show support for transition reforms, and therefore that the
impact of democracy will be reinforced in cultures ranking high on this dimension.
Hypothesis 1 :
∂Ri,t
∂Democi,t
= β1 + β3Individualismi,where β3 > 0 (2.5)
Power distance relates to the degree to which less powerful members of society accept and
respect an unequal distribution of authority and power. In a narrower sense, power distance
measures people’s attitudes towards a person of authority at work and stance towards desiring
an autocratic/paternalistic boss as opposed to a consultative, consensus-oriented one. In
high power distance countries, centralization at work is popular and an ideal boss acts as a
benevolent autocrat Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 76.
23For replicated Hofstede data, see working paper version (Beugelsdijk et al., 2013).
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However, as Hofstede et al. (2010) point out, correlations with power distance also extend
beyond the workplace. At school and in family, students and children in high power distance
countries tend to be more dependent on authority figures and are generally taught obedience
to their elders and teachers (p. 72). In the matters of the state, high power distance cultures
see hierarchy and authority as a basic fact of life and accept that “might prevails over right”
is a legitimate source of power; as a result, citizenry in high power distance countries tends
to be less politically engaged and less likely to resist the established hierarchies based on
tradition and unearned privileges (pp. 77-79).
This emphasis on the acceptance and, sometimes, desire for inegalitarianism in authority
appears antithetical to the more egalitarian and meritocratic order promoted in the market
system. Furthermore, a culture of acceptance of rigid hierarchies may plausibly impede the
dismantlement of the centralized system of governance existing under communism, where
one paternalistic party (and its apparatchiks) sat at the top of the hierarchy pyramid, with
the general populace largely locked out from the levers of power. Therefore, in high power
distance transition countries, the entrenched socialist elements may have continued to hold
considerable sway in politics even after the nominal collapse of centralized one-party rule.
The expectation is that the impact on market reform of democratization is suppressed in
high power distance countries.
Hypothesis 2 :
∂Ri,t
∂Democi,t
= β1 + β3PowerDistancei,where β3 < 0 (2.6)
Uncertainty avoidance refers to the degree to which a society feels threatened by unex-
pected or novel situations. Low tolerance for uncertainty correlates strongly with aversion
toward the unknown and more pronounced anxieties in the face of ambiguity. Different is
seen as dangerous and uncertainty as a threat to be fought. Cultures ranking highly on
this dimension, all else equal, are generally slower to adapt to change and tend to deal with
anxiety and stress through more pronounced regulation, distrust of foreigners, nationalism,
stifling of innovation, and top-down authority.
Importantly, uncertainty avoidance differs from risk avoidance (Hofstede et al., 2010,
p. 197). Whereas risk aversion is attached to a specific object or event with a certain
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probability of occurrence, anxiety associated with this cultural dimension has no object and
uncertainty no affiliated probability. Once uncertainty is expressed as risk, anxiety becomes
fear of specific, yet potentially manageable events or objects. Rather than reducing familiar
risks, uncertainty avoiding societies seek reduction of overall ambiguity through desiring
more predictable, structured, and interpretable situations, institutions, and experiences.
The market transition has by its very nature been highly uncertain process. The sudden
introduction of market institutions brought about not simply economic ambiguities, but also
an entirely novel way of life toward which uncertainty-avoiding societies could plausibly feel
strong aversion. Price and wage liberalization, competition, mass privatization, and the
introduction of hard budget constraints represented a general shift from state- to individual-
level responsibility in managing one’s economic decisions and well-being.24 These changes
likely exasperated anxieties in the face of uncertainty over the future of one’s income and
employment prospects.
Related to that argument, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) link in a theoretical model
the adoption of efficiency-enhancing reforms to the ex ante uncertainty about the future
distribution of gains and losses post-reforms. This uncertainty in identifying winners and
losers of reforms generates the “status quo bias” that prevents reforms from being adopted.
Hence, the degree of uncertainty avoidance may plausibly act as one gauge of willingness to
undergo market reforms. The prior is that the positive effect of democratization on reform
adoption is suppressed with higher levels of uncertainty avoidance.
Hypothesis 3 :
∂Ri,t
∂Democi,t
= β1 + β3UncertaintyAvoidancei,where β3 < 0 (2.7)
Countries ranking highly on the long-term orientation dimension tend to generally focus
more on the future and less on immediate gratification. Higher degree of long-term orien-
tation correlates with patience, thrift, and lower focus on leisure. Tradition and established
practices in long-term oriented societies are less emphasized and societal change is accepted
more readily. In that respect, one may expect that countries scoring high on this dimension
may be more likely to view reforms as an investment in the future, and to endure the pains
24Additionally, Carvalho et al. (2016) show the negative effects of large-scale privatization in transition
economies on measures of well-being.
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of transition for long-term gains offered by the market order.
On the other hand, the lower end of this dimension (short-term orientation) correlates
with greater acceptance of meritocracy, promotion of personal achievement, and thinking for
oneself as the core values of one’s work ethic. The relationship among long-term orientation,
democracy, and reforms adoption may therefore not be straightforward. Nevertheless, the
basic assumption is that high levels of long-term orientation exert no inhibiting effect on
democratization.
Hypothesis 4 :
∂Ri,t
∂Democi,t
= β1 + β3LongTermOrientationi,where β3 > 0 (2.8)
Indulgence vs. Restraint refers to the level of gratification a society allows itself. In-
dulgent societies feature greater overall happiness, laxer social rules and norms, and more
openness towards foreign cultures. Restrained societies are stricter with social norms and
place higher importance on maintaining order in the nation. The relationship between mar-
ket reforms and this dimension is also complex: on the one hand, more indulgent societies
may be less willing to give up gratification to undergo the pain of reforms; on the other,
restrained societies are likely to impose strict maintenance of order and hierarchical power
structures inimical to the culture of the markets. I find no significant empirical results for
this variable and do not discuss the matter further.
Figures 2.3-2.7 display simple bivariate correlations between cultural dimensions and
end-of-period average reform levels in 2001. Linear best fit lines indicate, prima facie, that
individualism and indulgence are positively, while power distance, uncertainty avoidance,
and long-term orientation weakly negatively related with the average CH index. Correlations
between different cultural dimensions are presented in Table 2.2.
2.4.3 Control Variables
The econometric models used in this paper follow similar baseline specifications used in
the empirical transition literature, which include as control variables the level of political
freedom/liberalization, real GDP growth rate, initial conditions at the onset of transition,
and time trends (see, e.g., Falcetti et al., 2006, 2002; Merlevede, 2003; De Melo et al., 2001).
22
For further sensitivity checks, the presence of armed conflict, EU accession dummy, and
temporally lagged reform (in the dynamic panel specifications) are added to these models as
additional controls.
Democracy levels are measured by the Polity IV index (Center for Systemic Peace). This
variable gauges the level of democracy within political regimes on a scale from -10 (strong
autocracy) to +10 (fully consolidated democracy) (Figure 2.2). In order to capture the coun-
tries’ democratic capacity, the composite Polity IV index takes into account: (i) the compet-
itiveness of executive recruitment, (ii) openness of executive recruitment, (iii) constraints on
the chief executive, and (iv) competitiveness and regulation of political participation (Mar-
shall et al., 2012). In this framework, a fully consolidated and mature democracy features
unrestricted and fully competitive political arena as well as substantial constraints on the
chief executive.25
Real GDP growth rate (World Bank World Development Indicators) is derived as annual
percentage change of real GDP expressed in terms of constant 2005 U.S. dollars. The data on
violent conflict are based on the information from the Major Episodes of Political Violence
(MEPV) data set (Center for Systemic Peace). The MEPV data set provides information
on interstate, societal, and communal violence and warfare. A binary dummy that equals 1
is assigned for each year in which a conflict resulting in over 500 deaths was observed, and
0 otherwise.
The binary EU accession dummy takes the value of 1 in years in which a transition
country is undergoing the EU accession process, defined from the moment an application for
membership was submitted. This dummy accounts for the total effect of EU integration on
reforms. On the one hand, the EU stipulates a functioning market economy and democracy
as the necessary conditions for membership; in that sense, the accession process may serve
as an anchor for further institutional improvement in applicant countries. However, the
acceptance of membership application by the EU may also discourage further reforms because
the “carrot” of membership may not be as enticing during the candidacy stage of accession
25Note that the relevant metric for democracy levels is polity2, which treats interregnum periods as a part
of the continuum. Countries that were a part of a unified state between 1989 and its breakup receive the
polity2 score of that state (for example, Ukraine receives polity2 score of the USSR for 1989 and 1990, Czech
Republic receives polity2 score of Czechoslovakia for 1989-1992).
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once increased access to EU structural funds is obtained.
The initial conditions, representing countries’ “starting positions” in the transition pro-
cess, consist of a set of 11 different variables that control for economic and institutional
characteristics at the onset of transition.26 From data on these variables, country scores are
captured by two principal components derived through factor analysis. Together the princi-
pal components explain 67 percent of the variation in initial conditions in terms of economic
development, market familiarity, and macroeconomic distortions in or around 1989. Data
on principle components are borrowed from Falcetti et al. (2002).
The first principal component (initial condition 1) is associated with the degree of mar-
ket familiarity and initial macroeconomic distortions. The second principal component
(initial condition 2) more closely correlates with state capacity and the initial degree of
economic development inclusive of the “socialist overhang” commonly associated with over-
industrialization in socialist economies. The principal components are time-invariant but
they also enter regression equations interacted with the linear trend to allow for their effects
to propagate or diminish in importance over time.
Lastly, trend and squared trend are introduced to account for nonlinearities in reform
progress, as well as to address concerns regarding the possibility of spurious correlation.
Figure ?? below displays the plot of the first (horizontal axis) and second (vertical axis)
normalized principal component vectors for the 21 countries in the data set. See Table 2.1
for summary statistics of explanatory variables.
2.5 Results
Appendix Tables 2.3-2.7 report parameter estimates from eight specifications by four
different estimators for Equations (2.1) and (2.2). The cultural dimensions enter regression
equations centered and standardized around the sample mean. In all specifications, estimates
26These variables are: (i) GDP per capita in 1989, (ii) pre-transition growth rate, (iii) trade dependence on
CMEA, (iv) degree of over industrialization, (v) urbanization rate, (vi) natural resources dummy, (vii) years
spent under central planning, (viii) distance to EU, (ix) dummy for pre-transition existence as a sovereign
state, (x) repressed inflation, and (xi) black market premium. Country scores obtained by multiplying each
of the above variables with a factor loading. Initial conditions normalized to have the mean of zero. See
Falcetti et al. (2002) and De Melo et al. (2001) for further discussion.
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are obtained using cluster (country) robust standard errors.
Of primary interest are the coefficients of the interaction term Democ × Cult, and the
full marginal impact of democracy conditional on different cultural dimensions. Table 2.3
reports regression estimates for individualism vs. collectivism dimension. As per prior
expectations, the coefficients of the interaction term for this dimension are positive and
statistically significant across different estimators. The result holds even when controlling
for past values of reform efforts.
The positive sign of the interaction term here implies that in more individualistic coun-
tries the effectiveness of democracy on promoting reforms is amplified. Based on Figure
2.8, at the highest observed individualism level, the positive impact of democracy is several
orders of magnitude larger than near the point where the effect loses statistical significance.
At the lower extremum of individualism, the marginal effect of democracy becomes negative,
implying that democratization in highly collectivist cultures adversely affects market reform
adoption, all else equal.
With respect to power distance (Table 2.4), the coefficient of the interaction term stays
negative and statistically significant across different specifications. The positive marginal
effect of democracy weakens with higher power distance, from two standard deviations of
power distance below sample mean at its highest magnitude, until the effect vanishes at about
half a standard deviation below sample mean (Figure 2.9). For extreme positive values of
power distance (high tolerance for unequal dispersion of power), the effect of democracy
likewise reverses and affects reform adoption negatively, all else equal.
Table 2.5 reports the results for the uncertainty avoidance dimension. In line with the
expectations, higher uncertainty avoidance suppresses the effect of democracy on reform
adoption, and this result similarly holds across specifications. Significant results for the
overall CH index, however, are only found in the dynamic panel model. In static models,
only the CH privatization subindex is significantly associated with this cultural dimension.
At extremely high tolerance for uncertain situations, the positive effect on reforms of a unit
increase of democracy is about three times as large as compared to uncertainty avoidance
levels where the positive effect vanishes (Figure 2.10).
The results for the long-term orientation and indulgence vs. restraint dimensions are
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given in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, respectively. Significant positive result for long-term orientation
is obtained only in the dynamic models (borderline significant at p = 0.102 for the full
controls specification). The coefficients for the interaction term for indulgence vs. restraint
dimensions are of expected negative sign, but are statistically insignificant at usual levels.
Overall, the results are broadly consistent with the hypotheses, even after controlling for
the presence of armed conflict, EU accession process, and other time-invariant characteristics
such as institutional and economic heritage. A culture fostering individualistic worldviews
may provide for a fertile soil for the emergence of markets. Where citizens prioritize the
pursuit of private interest over common good, the demand for market based institutions
is likely greater, and the political costs of reforms, enforcement, and monitoring by the
government lower.
Alternatively, the preference for centralized economic and political systems is likely more
pronounced in cultures scoring high on the power distance dimension. In these countries, the
elites’ turnover rate after the advent of democracy post-1989 may have been lower, allowing
for the entrenched elements of the old communist guard to remain influential in policymaking
and thus slow down reform progress. Casual observation seems to lend some support to this
assertion. Whereas Czech Republic, a relatively low power distance country (power distance
0.50 standard deviations below mean) was quick to enact lustration laws banning former
communist officials from political engagement, in Moldova, a relatively high power distance
country (power distance one standard deviation above that of Czech Republic’s), the Party
of Communists of the Republic of Moldova won absolute majority in the 2001 parliamentary
elections.
Uncertainty avoidance is also found to mute the positive effect of democracy, although
statistically significant results were obtained mostly for privatization efforts (specifications 1-
6). Cultures that exhibit low tolerance for the unknown may be more likely to resist policies
that tend to disturb the status quo. Privatization was certainly one such policy. Introduc-
tion of the hard budget constraint in state-owned enterprises meant that inefficiencies and
redundancies needed to be cut for continued operation. Mass layoffs following privatization
were a major source of unemployment shocks and declining living standards for many, as
well as anxiety for those that remained employed.
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The empirical results so far suggest that democracy’s impact on market reform may not
have been as robustly positive as previously hypothesized. In societies where culture fosters
pursuit of individual interests, acceptance of uncertainty, and intolerance for traditional
power hierarchies, democracy provided for a mechanism to tie the state apparatus to the
will of the electorate that likely viewed the market order more favorably. Among cultures
that foster contrary sentiments, democratization, at best, may not have necessarily generated
popular pressures on the state to implement reforms. At worst, democratization generated
perverse incentives for the political parties to compete in promoting the undoing any existing
reform progress. For instance, such political parties enjoyed significant popularity in the
Balkans during the 1990s and 2000s.
2.6 Robustness Checks
So far the empirical evidence suggests that the impact of democracy was significantly moder-
ated by the cultural environment from which it emerged. In order to further corroborate the
importance of culture in market transition, this section subjects the baseline results to sen-
sitivity checks in three different ways: first, by employing a measure for transition countries’
composite cultural similarity with the United States; second, by considering the confound-
ing influence of social capital and its relationship with Hofstede cultural dimensions; and
third, by teasing out the causal influence of culture on reforms using instrumental variable
methods.
2.6.1 Cultural Distance
Table 2.8 introduces new empirical estimates from identical econometric specifications using
cultural distance instead of individual cultural dimensions. Cultural distance (CD) combines
data from all five cultural dimensions to establish the degree of composite cultural relatedness
between different country pairs. The computed cultural distance score between countries i
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and j is based on the well-known formula developed by Kogut and Singh (1988):
CDi =
1
5
5∑
n=1
[(Ii,n − Ij,n)2/Vn], 27 (2.9)
where n is one of the five cultural dimensions, i is a transition country, j is the reference
country, and V is the sample (including country j ) variance of the nth cultural dimension.
In this paper country j is chosen to be the United States due to its long and established
history of having market institutions. In that respect, the assumption is that greater cultural
distance to the United States also speaks to country i ’s potentially lesser familiarity with
the market system and lower proclivity for reform.
Similarly to other cultural variables, CD is time-invariant and standardized around the
sample mean, and enters the regression equations interacted with the time-variant Polity IV
democracy levels.28 The expectation is that the effectiveness of democratization on reforms
will be diminished with greater cultural distance from the U.S.:
Hypothesis 5 :
∂Ri,t
∂Democi,t
= β1 + β3CDi,where β3 < 0. (2.10)
The empirical results from Table 2.8 provide support for the hypothesis that cultural
dissimilarity to the U.S. matters for the effectiveness of democratization on market reform
adoption.
Hence, individual cultural dimensions likely operated synergistically in their total effect
on reform adoption: in countries ranking highly on individualism and low on power distance
and uncertainty avoidance (i.e., countries more culturally similar to the United States),
market reforms proceeded more robustly after democratization, all else equal. The models
predict that countries which democratized more extensively will also be more economically
reformed if they possess the “right” mix of cultural attitudes. The FSU countries, which on
average lagged behind those in CEE in both political and economic liberalization, exhibited,
27Note that uncertainty avoidance data for Kyrgyzstan are missing; for this country, cultural distance
score has been computed using the remaining four dimensions of individualism, power distance, long-term
orientation, and indulgence vs. restraint.
28The mean and standard deviation of the non-standardized CD scores are 6.19 and 1.94, respectively,
with the minimum of 1.99 and the maximum of 9.49.
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on average, relatively higher levels of collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance.
Among some of the CEE countries that democratized relatively quickly and fully after 1989,
those more culturally similar to the U.S. (e.g., Czech Republic, Croatia, Poland) generally
tended to be more reformed by 2001 than more culturally distant countries (e.g., Bulgaria,
Romania).
2.6.2 Social Capital
By now a sizable literature links economic development with the amount of social capital
within countries (see, e.g., Tabellini, 2010; Zak and Knack, 2001; Knack and Keefer, 1997.
Introduced by Bourdieu in 1972 and widely popularized by Putnam et al. (1994), social
capital is broadly defined as the collection of social and civic behaviors, beliefs, and norms
that facilitate cooperation, reduce collective action problems, and encourage socially valu-
able activities between individuals (Nannicini et al., 2013; Guiso et al., 2010; Durlauf and
Fafchamps, 2005).
Chief among these traits is social trust, which enables individuals to more readily interact,
engage in contracts, and solve prisoner’s dilemma type problems, leading to more efficient
economic outcomes (Tabellini, 2010).29 Most empirical studies on social capital use as proxies
for social capital different measures of generalized trust toward others whom the survey
respondents do not know (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015). Higher levels of trust within societies
also coincide with well-established norms of reciprocity that require individuals to regularly
follow through on their commitments.
How do Hofstede cultural dimensions relate to aspects of social capital such as trust?
Although there is some conceptual overlap,30 norms of trust and reciprocity more closely
resemble the Northian notion of behavioral constraints, while the more highly aggregated
Hofstede cultural dimensions may also envelop societal preferences for particular social or
29Other proxies for social capital in the empirical literature included blood donations or electoral partici-
pation rate.
30For example, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2012) note that more individualistic societies are also more
trusting in part because the individualistic independent self interacts with everyone in the same way whereas
the collectivist self assumes different behaviors when interacting with in-group relative to the out-group
with whom relationships are less important of frequent (p. 17). Hofstede et al. (2010) note that a related
individualism dimension correlates with trustworthiness and tolerance of others across countries.
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institutional orders. In the context of transition, the degree of trust can inform the state’s
estimate of the transaction and enforcement costs of supplying market-based institutions
that delegate economic transactions and cooperation to freely acting individuals and firms.
However, trust operates primarily at a passive level (between citizens only), and hence may
be less likely to directly influence political demand for institutions, as well as normative
views on governance and policymaking.
To check whether cultural dimensions exert influence over reform adoption independently
of social capital, I introduce as an additional control variable a measure of generalized trust
within societies obtained from the WVS database. The WVS survey question (item A165)
asks: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be
too careful in dealing with people? Trust levels within transition countries are measured by
the share of people who responded that most people can be trusted (inclusive of the small
number of people who responded with “Don’t know”).
Since 1981, the WVS conducted surveys over several 5-year waves during which a nation-
ally representative sample of people is contacted within a country.31 Because surveys may
be administered across countries in different years within the same wave, the data on trust
for transition countries are unbalanced and highly irregular. To provide for the broadest
possible measure of trust levels, I pool the data for the most relevant time frame from up
to two consecutive waves ranging between 1990 and 2004. Hence, the percentage of trust-
ing individuals Trust is a time-invariant metric for generalized social trust during the early
period of market transition.32
The truncated results in Table 2.9 show that the coefficient estimates of variable Trust
never enters statistically significantly in static panel models (fixed, random, and mixed ef-
fects), and that previously obtained results hold. However, trust is positively and signifi-
cantly associated with reform efforts in most dynamic panel specifications. Of these, the
statistically significant results for the effects of uncertainty avoidance vanish once trust is
accounted for.
31These waves took place during the time periods 1981-1984, 1990-1994, 1995-1998, 1999-2004, 2005-2009,
and 2010-2014. Only 1990-1994, 1995-1998, and 1999-2004 waves are used in the calculation of trust scores
for countries in the study.
32Trust unconditional mean = 26.3 percent, st. dev. = 6.1 percent
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2.6.3 IV Estimates
Lastly, a potential source of bias may arise from the feedback effect from economic reforms
to democratization, although recent evidence from a wide sample of countries shows that is
not the case.33 Nevertheless, to find a more exogenous source of variation for democracy, I
follow a related approach as in Giuliano et al. (2013) in employing a country’s neighbors’
democracy scores in instrumenting for domestic democracy. The intuition is that the sta-
bility of fledgling democracies across post-communist Europe and Asia will be influenced
by political experiences of their neighbors.34 Furthermore, while democracy in neighboring
countries may affect domestic democracy, it is unlikely to influence the adoption of domestic
market reforms directly.
In order to construct an instrument for domestic Polity IV index, I calculate a convex
combination of N contiguously neighboring countries’ Polity IV scores as the instrument for
domestic democracy in country i :
DemocIVi,t =
N∑
j=1
αi,jDemocj,t, (2.11)
∑
αi,j = 1,
35
where weights α are shares of neighbor j ’s borders in total border length of country i.36
The idea is that countries sharing longer common border also carry greater importance
in influencing each other’s democracies. In that sense, one might expect that Poland’s
democracy will be to a greater extent influenced by neighboring Germany than by likewise
neighboring Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast.
Another way to mitigate concerns over endogeneity of culture is to strengthen the ar-
gument for its temporal stability by considering only the cultural attitudes of the 1941
33See, e.g., Giuliano et al. (2013); also, Grosjean and Senik (2011) for a similar argument regarding
transition countries.
34See Leeson and Dean (2009) for a related argument on the “contagiousness” of democracy across the
world.
35Note that countries belonging to a federation before its dissolution share the same Polity IV score. After
the common federation’s break-up, the countries’ domestic democracy score is re-calculated to reflect the
weighted average.
36The data on border lengths obtained from CIA World Factbook.
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generational cohort. The trade-off is that although fewer respondents are used to compute
the countries’ overall culture scores, the focus on the elder cohort decreases the likelihood of
cultural change as worldviews of people born between 1902 and 1958 will be less malleable
than those of younger generations during the observed 1989-2001 time period.
In all structural equations the domestic Polity IV variable appears twice: standing alone
and also as a constitutive part of the interaction term with other cultural dimensions. Hence
there are two variables to be instrumented, Democ and Democ × Cult1941d ,37 and two ex-
cluded instruments DemocIV and DemocIV ×Cult1941d , in an exactly-identified model. Table
2.10 reports second-stage 2SLS estimates for four cultural dimensions (individualism, power
distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation), each estimated using fixed (FE)
and random (RE) effects, for the total of eight specifications.38
The results mostly conform to those presented in the preceding section. However, in con-
trast to the dynamic model of Equation (2.2), the coefficient of the interaction term between
long-term orientation and democracy is negative and statistically significant.39 Moreover,
similar coefficients for uncertainty avoidance are statistically insignificant in both FE and
RE models. (The same holds true for when the privatization CH subindex is used as the
dependent variable.)
On the other hand, the coefficients and significance of the interaction terms with individ-
ualism and power distance are robust to these alternative specifications. In fact, using the
cultural dimension values from the 1941 cohort, magnitudes of the effects are significantly
larger, sometimes several times the size compared to those from the inter-generational sim-
ple average. To the extent that voting preferences and worldviews of the older cohort carry
greater weight in influencing reform policy, the results from original specifications might be
understated.
37The results remain unchanged if the original interaction term between averaged cultural score and
democracy is specified as endogenous.
38First stage results available upon request. Recall that no generational data exist for long-term orienta-
tion; for this dimension, the overall culture score is used.
39However, the marginal effect of democracy conditional on the level of long-term orientation is not sta-
tistically different from zero across given levels of this cultural dimension.
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2.7 Conclusion
During the last decade of the 20th century, countries across Central-Eastern Europe and
Central Asia shed their centralized political and economic systems and began their transition
towards markets and democracy. Yet even early during transition, these countries differed in
terms of the pace and extent of the adoption of market reforms. The literature on institutions
has emphasized the role of informal norms as a complement to the introduction of new formal
rules or institutions. Pejovich’s analysis of culture’s role as a determinant of transition
outcomes provides a useful theoretical framework for the understanding of the necessity of
the “capitalistic mindset” in the successful creation of an order based on free markets and
private property. In this framework, if the existing culture clashes with proposed formal
market institutions, the transaction costs of adopting new formal rules will be higher.
This paper builds on the literature on transition market reforms to provide an empirical
account of whether and how different cultural dimensions affected the creation of market
institutions in transition economies. In doing so, I examine the effects of Hofstede cultural
dimensions on reform performance in an unbalanced panel of 21 transition countries observed
between 1989 and 2001. The basic premise is that culture affected reform adoption by
moderating the impact of democratization; conditional on a country’s predominant cultural
values, the effectiveness of political on economic liberalization differed.
The overall results provide empirical evidence in support of Pejovich’s “interaction the-
sis:” culture mattered in the process of market transition. The results of the preceding
sections are overall indicative of the predominance of two cultural dimensions in influencing
institutional transition from centralized to market economy. Where culture fosters behav-
ioral incentives that favor pursuit of private interests and desire for political egalitarianism,
the pressures on the government to implement reforms are likely higher.
What are the implications for the behavior of political elites? In economically and
politically unfree countries where leadership is aware of prevailing cultural attitudes, the
reform-minded executive may feel more comfortable implementing political and economic
liberalization in tandem if local culture exhibits more friendly attitudes toward economic
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reform.40 In societies where culture imposes additional costs in implementing reforms, the
reform-minded executive can find democratization to decrease prospects of incumbency. In
that case, the executive may withhold from political liberalization and proceed with eco-
nomic reforms only. Alternatively, the executive may choose partial democratization but
engage in populist rhetoric or ideological engineering in an attempt to change the underlying
culture.
The results from this chapter suggest that democratization may be the underlying trans-
mission channel connecting culture to economic development, and that culture is one way
to contextualize the impact of political on economic reform. Naturally, one must refrain
from value judgments when discussing an “ideal” mix of cultural attitudes. As in Gorod-
nichenko and Roland (2011), the same caveat applies here: there are no “best” cultures, only
the implied trade-offs in undergoing as drastic of an institutional change as was the market
transition.
40In a comparative study on the effects of democratization on the support for market economy (and market
development on the support for democracy) in 28 transition countries in the year 2006, Grosjean and Senik
(2011) provide empirical evidence in support of the former, but not the latter. They suggest that the demand
for democracy is not stimulated through market development, but rather that the public support for a market
economy comes about as the result of democratization. Hence, political followed by economic liberalization
appeared to have been the recommended reform sequencing for countries at the onset of market transition.
Using longitudinal data, the present study extends their conclusion to argue that the effectiveness of such
sequencing is conditional on the levels of several stable cultural attributes that may, broadly speaking, be
conceptually linked to the support for creation of market institutions.
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2.8 Appendix
Policy input variables underlying the CH indices (Source: Campos and Horva´th, 2012):
Internal liberalization index
1. Number of goods subject to price regulation (basket of 15 goods)
2. Wage regulation
External liberalization index
1. Compatibility with Article VIII
2. Controls on commercial credit
3. Controls on foreign direct investment
4. Controls on liquidation of FDI
5. Documentation requirements for release of foreign exchange for imports
6. Exchange rate taxes
7. Export duties as % of tax revenue
8. Export licenses
9. Export taxes
10. Import licenses and quotas
11. Import tariff rate
12. Interest rate liberalization
13. Investment transactions
14. Multiple exchange rates
15. OECD membership
16. Permission for foreign exchange accounts held abroad by residents
17. Permission for foreign exchange accounts held domestically by residents
18. Permission of foreign exchange accounts for non-residents
19. Repatriation requirements
20. Repatriation requirements for invisible transactions
21. Surrender requirements
22. Surrender requirements for invisible transactions
23. Tariff code lines
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Privatization index
1. Share of small firms privatized
2. Total number of enterprises privatized
3. Total number of small and medium-sized enterprises privatized
4. Total number of large enterprises privatized
5. Share of foreign-owned banks in total number of banks
6. Total number of private enterprises
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics, explanatory variables
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Individualism vs. Collectivism 42.6 78.1 17.0 76.0
Power Distance 78.1 10.6 52.5 99.0
Uncertainty Avoidance 81.9 10.6 50.5 97.0
Long-Term Orientation 65.1 13.3 38.0 86.0
Indulgence vs. Restraint 39.5 12.6 11.0 62.5
Polity VI Democracy 4.8 5.1 -9 +10
Real GDP Growth (%) -0.93 9.62 -44.90 13.30
Armed Conflict 0.16 0.36 0 1
EU Accession 0.29 0.45 0 1
Initial Condition 1 -0.38 2.06 -3.53 3.24
Initial Condition 2 0.21 1.35 -3.08 1.94
Notes: descriptive statistics consistent with regression subsample obser-
vations in specification (4). N = 230.
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Table 2.2: Cultural dimensions correlation matrix.
IND PDA UA LTO IR
Individualism vs. Collectivism 1
Power Distance -0.5324 1
Uncertainty Avoidance 0.0936 -0.1519 1
Long-term Orientation 0.055 -0.1163 -0.0327 1
Indulgence vs. Restraint 0.2131 -0.3811 -0.1987 -0.4005 1
Notes: IND = individualism vs. collectivism; PDA = power distance; UA =
uncertainty avoidance; LTO = long-term orientation; IR = indulgence vs. re-
straint.
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of the CH reform index by country, 1989-2001.
39
Figure 2.2: Evolution of democracy as measured by the Polity IV index by country, 1989-
2001.
40
Figure 2.3: Scatter plot of the relationship between 2001 CH index (vertical axis) and indi-
vidualism vs. collectivism (horizontal axis).
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Figure 2.4: Scatter plot of the relationship between 2001 CH index (vertical axis) and power
distance (horizontal axis).
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Figure 2.5: Scatter plot of the relationship between 2001 CH index (vertical axis) and un-
certainty avoidance (horizontal axis)
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Figure 2.6: Scatter plot of the relationship between 2001 CH index (vertical axis) and long-
term orientation (horizontal axis).
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Figure 2.7: Scatter plot of the relationship between 2001 CH index (vertical axis) and in-
dulgence vs. restraint (horizontal axis).
Figure 2.8: The marginal effect of democracy conditional on the level of individualism.
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Figure 2.9: The marginal effect of democracy conditional on the level of power distance.
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Figure 2.10: The marginal effect of democracy conditional on the level of uncertainty avoid-
ance.
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Chapter 3
Liberalizing Reforms and the
European Union: Accession,
Membership, and Convergence
3.1 Introduction
In 1957 the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC), subse-
quently known under the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht as the European Union (EU). The EEC
began as a group of only six countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, and West Germany). Today the EU has expanded to 28 countries with the latest
member, Croatia, joining in 2013. The EU’s broad purpose is to promote peace, cooper-
ation, and prosperity amongst its member countries. However, the desirability of the EU
has been called into question by Britain’s decision to exit (“Brexit”) the EU in June 2016,
and the suggestion that other countries such as Austria, Finland, France, Hungary, and the
Netherlands will soon follow.1
The reasons behind support for Brexit and the discontentment of some other countries
with the EU are numerous and complex. Understanding those reasons and whether or
not they are based on accurate perceptions is a matter of great interest to, among others,
1http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/25/european-leaders-fear-brexit-vote-could-herald-eu-
collapse-unles/
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European citizens, policymakers, and global financial market participants. To do so, in turn,
involves an understanding of the economic and political consequences of EU accession and
membership. In this chapter we make a contribution to this understanding by estimating
the relationships between EU accession and membership and changes in the quality of a
country’s policies and institutions.
As part of an economic union, EU countries share a customs union and a uniform trade
policy. Goods, capital, and people can move freely across borders within the EU. As part
of a political union its members work through shared institutions such as the European
Council, the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament
to collectively set foreign policy and, to a limited extent, aspects of domestic policy as well.
The conditions for accession to the EU include political reforms that foster democracy and
the rule of law; also economic reforms that promote well-functioning markets. In this chapter
we are concerned with liberalizing economic reforms and explore the separate roles of the
EU accession process and EU membership in bringing them about and determining whether
or not they endure.
Membership in the EU and the process of accession to membership can affect the likeli-
hood and pace of economic reforms through distinct mechanisms. First, accession involves
a candidate country fulfilling the so-called Copenhagen criteria. Formalized at the 1993
European Council and following former communist countries’ expression of intent to accede,
these criteria stipulate demonstrable commitment to the rule of law and a well-functioning
market economy. Potential admission to the EU is a “carrot” that provides incentives for
candidates to undertake reforms. Second, once membership has been attained a country
becomes part of the EU common market. The common market may facilitate Tiebout-type
(1956) jurisdictional competition amongst members. Being able to move freely across the
EU, individuals can “vote with their feet,” exercising their exit option when institutions and
policies are inconsistent with their preferences (Hirschman, 1978). This creates incentives
for members to undertake reforms in efforts to preserve their tax bases.2
2Tiebout competition will be limited to the extent that individual member governments can extract rents
from fixed factors (Epple and Zelenitz, 1981). However, intra-EU labor and capital mobility limits that
possibility. However, Epple and Zelenitz highlight land as the fixed factor, of course, this is still the case of
EU members.
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Have these two mechanisms been operative and to what extent? This is an empirical
question that we bring to the data. Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for three Euro-
pean country-specific measures of policy and/or institutional quality at five-year intervals
from 1970 to 2010. The three measures are (i) the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of
the World (EFW) index, (ii) the KOF economic globalization index, and (iii) the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) transition indicator score. Numerous
studies have reported that EFW and KOF index scores correlate positively with desirable
economic outcomes, such as per capita income growth. (See section 3.2 below and the ci-
tations therein.) The EBRD transition indicators were developed specifically to gauge the
progress of reforms in Eastern European and former communist economies (Stern, 1997).
Prima facie the evidence reported in Table 3.1 is consistent with one or both of the mech-
anisms described above being operative. The average EFW, KOF, and EBRD scores across
European countries have all increased over time, in particular from 1990 onward. Cross-
European country unconditional convergence has occurred (also mostly since 1990) judging
by both the standard deviations and the coefficients of variation.
Of course, the observed improvement in measured institutional and policy quality could
have occurred despite any roles on the part of the EU. Furthermore, the improvement and
convergence in measures has not been uniform. The dispersion of EFW scores generally
increased from 1970 through 1990 and then subsequently fell. Similarly, the dispersion of
KOF scores remained stable through 1990 and then subsequently fell. (The EBRD indicators
are only available since 1989.) Most importantly from the point of view of the present study,
Table 3.1 tells us little regarding whether the incentives associated with EU accession or
the jurisdictional competition associated with EU membership accounts for the observed
improvements and convergence. In this chapter we empirically assess the role that each of
these mechanisms may play.
Only a handful of studies explore the relationship between EU accession and/or member-
ship and economic policy/institutional reforms.3 Sell (2005) reports that economic freedom
3Alternatively, there exists a sizable empirical literature on the direct effect of EU membership/integration
on economic welfare within member countries. The consensus is that being a part of the EU directly correlates
with living standards by positively affecting members’ GDP levels and growth rates. See, e.g., Ko¨nig (2015),
Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2008), Badinger (2005). In this chapter, the correlation between 5-year real GDP
per capita growth rate and EU membership is 0.56 and statistically significant.
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(EFW) scores are generally higher in EU versus non-EU countries. However, Sell’s analysis
is unconditional; it does not take into account other observable differences in countries aside
from EU membership. Hall et al. (2011) provide a more formal analysis and report that
EU membership has a small but positive impact on the levels of economic freedom between
1970 and 2010. Di Tommaso et al. (2007) report a positive correlation between EU associ-
ation agreements and a multidimensional latent variable captured by the EBRD scores for
25 transition economies over the 1989-2002 period. Schweickert et al. (2011) also study 25
transition countries and find that entering association agreements with the EU as well as the
pre-accession NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) positively contributed to governance
quality (measured by the aggregate World Bank Governance Indicators) between 1996 and
2008.4 More recently, Ugur (2013) also examines EU’s effect on governance quality (mea-
sured through the ICRG and World Bank Governance Indicators) among the Central and
Eastern European countries. Lastly, Mrak and Rojec (2013) provide an unconditional anal-
ysis of the accession process and transition indicators, concluding that they are positively
related.
None of the above studies provide a longer-run conditional analysis of the roles of EU
membership in the determination of policy and institutional reforms while considering the
full sample of European countries. In this chapter, we estimate the effects, separately, of EU
accession and EU membership on changes in measures of policy and institutional quality,
as well as cross-country convergence in those measures. We employ a panel of up to 45
European countries—both EU and non-EU members—covering the 1970-2010 period. As
measures of policy and institutional quality, we employ the EFW, KOF, and EBRD scores
described above briefly (and more thoroughly in section 3.3 below). Relative to previous
studies, we control for a more comprehensive set of potential additional correlates, as well
as country and time fixed effects. In this way, we attempt to isolate the separate effects of
EU membership and accession from those of a number of other factors that may influence
the spread of good policies.
4The association agreements represent the first formalization of relations between the EU and third
countries, and set up a framework for future cooperation. Although a pre-condition for an eventual EU
application, these agreements do not imply a commitment to join or to begin accession negotiations. Among
other countries, the EU signed association agreements with Morocco, South Africa, and Chile.
58
The results of our analysis are dependent on the particular measure of policy/institutional
quality that we consider. We find that being an EU member is associated with increases in
the economic freedom index while being in the accession process is associated with decreases
in trade barriers and increases in trade and FDI flows. These findings suggest that the
spread of policies relating to the spread of economic freedom broadly is encouraged by EU
membership, while the accession process tends to promote policies relating to international
trade openness in particular. However—and importantly—all significantly estimated effects
are quantitatively modest.
This chapter proceeds according to the following roadmap. In section 3.2, we elaborate
on the characteristics of EU membership and the process of accession to the EU. In doing
so we highlight the mechanisms that potentially link membership and accession to policy
and institutional change; also how our study improves upon existing literature in estimating
their importance for liberalizing reforms. In section 3.3 we describe our data and empirical
models. The results of estimating those models are reported in section 3.4. In section 3.5
we offer some concluding discussion.
3.2 The Mechanisms of EU Integration
The EU is a supranational entity of 28 independent European states that share a common
foreign and defense policy, maintain a unified intergovernmental legislature (the European
Parliament), and relegate final adjudication of disputes between members to the European
Court of Justice. Since 1957 the EU has gone through seven different enlargements, and any
European country is eligible to join following the fulfillment of membership conditions. The
EU common market allows for what the EU refers to as the “four freedoms of movement”:
people, capital, goods, and services.
Prior to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, EU membership was open only to the nations
of Western, Mediterranean, and Scandinavian Europe. The United Kingdom, Denmark, and
Ireland joined in 1973; Greece followed in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, and Austria,
Finland, and Sweden in 1995. Prior to joining the EU, these countries already enjoyed rela-
tively high living standards and were reasonably well-functioning democracies. Once former
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Eastern Bloc countries expressed their desires to join the union, conditions for member-
ship were formalized at the 1993 EU summit in Copenhagen, Denmark. These Copenhagen
Criteria mandate that applicant states fulfill three sets of membership conditions:
• political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, hu-
man rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
• economic criteria: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with com-
petition and market forces;
• administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the Acquis Commu-
nautaire (the total body of EU law) and ability to take on the obligations of membership.
In essence, applicants to the EU are expected to establish a consolidated democracy,
a decentralized market economy, and the rule of law before joining. Candidate countries
accede to the EU once they are evaluated to have undertaken sufficient reforms and judged
ready to implement and enforce the EU body of law. The process of EU accession offi-
cially begins when a country submits an application for membership. This process entails
a commitment on the part of prospective members to structural reforms and policy har-
monization. The conditions for submitting the membership application are only that the
country is geographically located in Europe and that it respects the basic precepts of human
rights and rule of law. Upon submitting the application, prospective members are expected
to pursue reforms of policies and institutions—both political and economic—while adjusting
their laws and regulations to bring them into full conformance with EU standards. Among
the former communist applicants the process of accession coincided with transition, during
which markets gradually replaced central planning in their economies. Perceived success in
market transition contributed to former communist countries achieving membership in 2004,
2007, and 2013.
The European Commission (EC) receives membership applications and issues opinions
whether applicant countries are ready to obtain candidacy status, which is then granted
by the European Council. As the candidate demonstrates commitment to reforms, the
EC and EU member governments allow for the opening of official accession negotiations.
During these negotiations the EC and other EU bodies track the progress in further policy
harmonization and assess whether the candidate country is ready to fulfill the obligations
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associated with implementation of the Acquis. At the closing of the negotiation chapters,
the candidate country has at least de jure incorporated the basic EU law into own legal
framework and reached EU-appropriate standards of political, economic, and administrative
development.5 Typically, there are 30-35 negotiation chapters that take on various policy
areas that the candidate is required to address prior to joining. Accession negotiations
address topics ranging from company law and taxation, to industrial policy and education.
As described above, one would expect to see the process of accession to the EU correlate
with institutional and policy reforms. However, for a number of reasons this may not be
the case. For example, the EC and other EU bodies may take into account considerations
other than—and perhaps at the expense of—the Copenhagen criteria. Also, monitoring of
candidates’ progress in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria may be imperfect. Furthermore,
candidates may desire to be part of the EU but not to actually undertake the reforms
required for membership. They may merely feign the appearance of reforms or they may
focus narrowly on particular reforms requested by the EC while ignoring or even backsliding
in other policy/institutional areas. These factors may negate a positive relationship between
EU accession and reforms, or at least weaken it significantly.
Following accession, EU membership may itself promote institutional and policy reforms.
Along a number of dimensions the EU resembles a market-preserving federalist system (Qian
and Weingast, 1997; Weingast, 1995). The EU governing bodies are seated atop a hierarchy of
governments where, below them, individual member country governments maintain primary
regulatory responsibility for their respective jurisdictions.6 In the joining the EU, however,
individual member governments transfer foreign, international trade, and monetary policy
authorities to the supranational governing bodies. The common market fosters jurisdictional
competition between member countries; individuals and capital are able to move towards
5The incentives to reform and comply with the Acquis may attenuate once the “carrot” of membership
is removed after joining EU. For instance, Trauner (2009) notes the shortcomings in enforcement of EU law
in Romania and Bulgaria, which received an “unusually high number” of official “letters of formal notice”
from the European Commission pointing out problems in incorporation of EU law into domestic legislation
after joining. Furthermore, they have “refrained from completing [reforms] in the first years of membership”
(p. 11).
6The EU permits its member states to exercise primary regulatory and legislative authority over their
own economies so long as that authority conforms to the laws and the minimum prescribed standards set
at the federal level. Failures in regulatory compliance are duly noted and taken to the European Court of
Justice, the principal EU regulatory overseer.
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those jurisdictions that offer them better (higher return) institutional/policy environments.
Furthermore, in that jurisdictional competition members are in principle constrained from
“cheating” by transferring their losses to other members. Participation in the monetary
zone and the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) helps to impose a hard budget
constraint on individual member governments. These institutions limit members’ access to
the “printing press” to cover losses at the expense of their fellow members.
If liberalizing economic reforms are associated with “good” outcomes (e.g., higher income
levels and growth rates) then we expect that EU member states involved in jurisdictional
competition with one another will make such reforms in order to retain and attraction addi-
tions to their tax bases.7 As with accession, however, there are caveats to this expectation.
Notably, if the rules of the monetary union are not adhered to then the EU may serve to
actually soften the budget constraints of its member country governments. This may be the
case with the breakdown of the Stability and Growth Pacts fiscal constraints and monitor-
ing, evident in the post-2008 bailouts of Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and Cyprus. If a
member government has a soft budget constraint, then it can impose the costs associated
with its bad policies onto other members. As such, a member government can compete for
increases to its tax base by enticing labor and capital from other members with policies for
which the costs are externalized to other members.
Note that neither EU accession nor membership is necessary to promote liberalizing re-
forms. For example, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and several other European microstates,
have achieved high levels of economic and policy integration with the EU despite themselves
not being members.8 These countries may be to a large extent effectively part of the juris-
dictional competition between EU member countries. That being said, it is still of interest
to know whether or not accession and/or membership on the margin facilitates liberalizing
economic reforms. Our analysis below will attempt to shed light on this issue.
7Whether or not liberalizing reforms are associated with “good” outcomes is, of course, an empirical
question. See the citations in section 3.3 below for evidence that liberal economic environments are associated
with particular outcomes (again, e.g., higher income levels) that are often considered to be desirable.
8On average, between 1970 and 2010, Norway had an EFW score of 6.77 and KOF scores of 71.77.
Iceland’s average scores are 6.55 for EFW and 63.41 for KOF. Switzerland’s average scores are 8.13 for EFW
and 79.32 for KOF. For the entire dataset, averages are 6.66 for EFW and 62.70 for KOF.
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3.3 Data and Empirical Framework
Our dependent variables are indicators of policy and institutional quality for which higher
values indicate more liberal policies and institutions. The first indicator that we consider
is the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index (Gwartney et al.,
2016). The EFW index gauges how supportive a country’s institutions and policies are
of well-defined and enforced property rights, individual choice, voluntary exchange, and
competitive markets without barriers to entry. Countries are scored using 42 variables to
examine five different dimensions of economic freedom: (i) size of government, (ii) legal
system and property rights, (iii) access to sound money, (iv) freedom to trade internationally,
and (v) the degree of regulation in the economy. Numerous studies report that country EFW
scores correlate positively with “good” economic outcomes.9 Since we are constructing a
cross-country panel we use the chain-linked EFW index values. For a recent survey of the
literature using the EFW index see Hall and Lawson (2014).
The second indicator that we consider is the KOF economic globalization index. The
economic globalization index is one component of the overall KOF globalization index which
measures the extent to which a country is globalized along economic, social, and political
dimensions (Dreher, 2006). Globalization is here conceived of as “a process that erodes na-
tional boundaries, integrates national economies, cultures, technologies, and governance and
produces complex relations of mutual interdependence” (Dreher, 2006, p. 3). As with the
EFW index, a number of studies have linked higher KOF index scores to “good” outcomes.10
The economic globalization specifically gauges a countries (i) restrictions on international
trade, capital, and income flows and (ii) the actual flows. Hence it is a measure of interna-
tional economic openness.
9The EFW index has been positively linked to income levels and growth rates (Young and Sheehan,
2014; Dawson, 2006; Gwartney and Lawson, 2006; De Haan and Sturm, 2000; Heckelman and Stroup, 2000;
Gwartney et al., 1999; Ayal and Karras, 1998), life expectancy and other health outcomes (Stroup, 2007),
political freedoms (Lawson and Clark, 2010), levels of trust within a population (Berggren and Jordahl, 2006),
labor shares (Young and Lawson, 2014), and measures of subjective well-being (Nikolaev, 2014; Gehring,
2013; Ovaska and Takashima, 2006).
10These outcomes include lower poverty (Bergh and Nilsson, 2014), better entrepreneurial policies (Norba¨ck
et al., 2014), higher spending on secondary and tertiary education (Baskaran and Hessami, 2012), greater gen-
der equality (Potrafke and Ursprung, 2012), and higher rates of income growth and convergence (Villaverde
and Maza, 2011). For a review of literature using KOF see Potrafke (2015).
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The third and final indicator that we consider is the EBRD transition indicator. This
metric gauges the extent of market reform mostly among the formerly communist economies
of Central-Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Countries are ranked according to their insti-
tutional/policy proximity to a market economy versus a centrally planned one. Six areas of
reforms are considered: (i) large-scale privatization, (ii) small-scale privatization, (iii) gover-
nance and enterprise restructuring, (iv) price liberalization, (v) trade and foreign exchange
system, and (vi) competition. Countries are rated for each area on a scale from 1 to “4+”,
where 1 indicates little movement away from a centrally planned economy and “4+” indi-
cates industrialized market economy institutions and policies.11 The overall EBRD indicator
is the average of area scores. Babecky and Havranek (2014) review 60 empirical works on
reforms in transition countries published between 1996 and 2013 and report that the reforms
captured by the EBRD indicator on average are linked to higher rates of economic growth.12
The literature suggests that the EFW, KOF, and EBRD indicators gauge policies and
institutions that are positively related to higher incomes and other desirable outcomes. Con-
ditional on this being the case, if the EU approximates a market-preserving federalism then
we expect that jurisdictional competition will lead to increases in and convergence of indi-
cator scores. Furthermore, to the extent that higher EFW, KOF, and EBRD scores indicate
policies and institutions that are consistent with the Copenhagen criteria then we expect
that accession to the also involves increases in and convergence of the scores.
We relate changes in country EFW, KOF, and EBRD indicators to participation in the
EU accession process and actual membership in the EU. To this end, we employ an unbal-
anced panel of up to 45 European countries for the 1970-2010 time period taken at 5-year
intervals (1970-1975; 1975-1980; ...; 2005-2010). Alternatively, we also relate EU member-
ship and accession to two measures of cross-country convergence in EFW, KOF, and EBRD
indicators. The first convergence measure that we consider is the change in a country’s
institutional/policy measure (Y ) taken as a percentage of the initial gap between its score
11EBRD states that the indicator ranges from “1 to 4+”. As of now, the highest score given to any
country for a given area is 4.33. More at: http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/economic-research-and-
data/data/forecasts-macro-data-transition-indicators.html.
12While Babecky and Havranek report that studies generally find the long-run effects on growth to be
positive, the ERBD indicator reforms tend also to impose short-run costs on the adopting economies. For
references to additional studies employing the EBRD indicator see Fidrmuc (2003) and Falcetti et al. (2002).
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and that of the leader country in the sample (LEADER):
CONV ERGENCE1(Y ) =
Yi,t − Yi,t−1
LEADERt − Yi,t−1 (3.1)
The second convergence measure that we consider is the end-of-period gap between a given
country and the leader relative to the initial gap:
CONV ERGENCE2(Y ) =
LEADERt − Yi,t
LEADERt−1 − Yi,t−1 (3.2)
Convergence measure (3.1) captures what percentage of the gap between a given country
and the leader is eliminated over the course of a 5-year period. Alternatively, convergence
measure (3.2) captures the end-of-period gap as a percentage of the initial gap.13
Participation in EU accession (ACC ) and EU membership (EU ) enter the estimations
as dummy variables that correspond to the start of a 5-year period and take the value of
1 if, respectively, a country is in the accession process or a member.14 All estimations also
include a country’s 5-year growth rate of real (2005 constant U.S. dollars) per capita GDP
and the natural log of its population, a NATO membership dummy, and a set of variables
that capture political institutions and government ideology.15
We include a NATO dummy because alliance members commit to promoting political
and economic liberties as well as mutual defense. The Study on NATO Enlargement (1995)
stipulates that new members “must commit themselves [...] [to] contribute to the develop-
ment of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions,
by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions
are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.”16 All but six EU
13Up to five extreme outliers in convergence variables were excluded from the estimations of (3.4) and (3.5).
These outliers arise due to a negligible difference between leader and individual observation, producing near-
zero values in the denominator in dependent variable formulae. From the continuum of observed values in
CONV ERGENCE1 and CONV ERGENCE2 we remove those maxima and minima that markedly stand
out so that individual observations remain within statistically reasonable levels of between ±4−7.5 standard
deviations away from the mean, depending on the distribution of the variable.
14The accession dummy accounts for countries that applied EU membership for but later withdrew their
application. These countries are Iceland (applied 2009; withdrew 2013), and Norway (applied 1969; withdrew
1972).
15Data on income and population come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDIs).
16Source:Study on NATO Enlargement. 1995. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Available at
URL: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official texts 24733.htm.
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countries (Sweden, Austria, Malta, Finland, Cyprus, and Ireland) are currently in NATO.
While membership in NATO is not a formal criterion for EU membership, most countries
that joined the EU at some point also became a part of NATO in the years prior to joining.
We also control for countries’ democracy levels, government ideologies, and population
sizes. Democracy levels are captured using the Polity IV index (Marshall et al., 2012).17
To the extent that political institutions are more democratic, this may correlate with the
tendencies towards liberalizing economic reforms. The ideological tendencies of government
may also be correlated with tendencies towards such reforms. Our estimations include two
controls for government ideology based on data from the Comparative Political Data Set
(CPD) (Armingeon et al., 2013) and the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions
(DPI) (Beck et al., 2001).18 The CPD ideology metric codes executive cabinet ideology on
a scale from 1 (hegemony or right wing and center parties in the executive branch) to 5
(hegemony of social-democratic and left-leaning parties). The DPI metric codes the chief
executive’s party orientation with respect to economic policy based on the right-center-left
scale (1, 2, and 3, respectively).19,20 Although measuring the same thing in principle, the DPI
and CPD metrics differ in terms of the time period observed and the sample of countries.
All estimations also include country fixed effects and most estimations include period
fixed effects as well. Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics for all variables included in
the estimations.
We estimate four different empirical models:
∆Yi,t = β1Yi,t−1 + β2EUi,t−1 + β3ACCi,t−1 + θX ′ + β0 + αi + δt + ui,t, (3.3)
17The Polity IV index gauges the extent and quality of a democracy within political regimes by considering
their (i) competitiveness of executive recruitment, (ii) openness of executive recruitment, (iii) constraints on
the chief executive, and (iv) competitiveness of political participation. Democracy levels are measures on a
continuum from −10 (total autocracy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).
18The relationship between regulatory quality and government/citizen ideology has been documented
across a sample of countries (Bjørnskov, 2005), Canadian provinces (Bjørnskov and Potrafke, 2012), German
states (Potrafke, 2013), and U.S. states (Bjørnskov and Potrafke, 2013).
19The score of zero is assigned when the executive party does not match the above criteria.
20For countries that were formerly part of the USSR we set pre-1990 government ideology and Polity IV
values to the USSR values. For the former Yugoslav republics we set the pre-1990 values to those of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; for Germany we use West Germany for 1990 and earlier; for Czech
and Slovak Republics we use Czechoslovakia for 1993 and earlier.
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CONV ERGENCE1(Y ) = β1Yi,t−1+β2EUi,t−1+β3ACCi,t−1+θX ′+β0+αi+δt+ui,t, (3.4)
CONV ERGENCE2(Y ) = β1Yi,t−1+β2EUi,t−1+β3ACCi,t−1+θX ′+β0+αi+δt+ui,t, (3.5)
Yi,t = ρYi,t−1+β2Y EARS EUi,t−1+β3Y EARS EU2i,t−1+β4ACCi,t−1+θX
′+β0+ui,t, (3.6)
where Y ={EFW, KOF, ERBD}, EU is the membership dummy, ACC is the accession
dummy, αi and δt are country and period fixed effects, respectively, and X is the vector
of controls. Note that while we observe our data set since 1970, taking a lag of variables
necessarily eliminates one time observation.21
Models (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5) are based on three dependent variables (5-years changes and
two convergence measures) discussed above. Model (3.6) comes at the topic of interest form
a different angle, asking whether or not spending more time as an EU member is associated
with more a more market-oriented policy/institutional environment. Rather than relating
EU membership to a certain amount of change in that environment, (3.6) allows for the
possibility that greater economic integration with the EU that develops over time as a func-
tion of time spent within its institutional structures. The variable Y EARS EU is defined
as the number of years a country has been a member of the EU. (Since diminishing returns
to additional time spent as a member may set in, we also include Y EARS EU squared.)
Model (3.6) is a typical autoregressive specification and conventional panel estimators will
be biased in finite samples (Nickell 1981). Therefore we employ the Arellano-Bover (1995) /
Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM estimator which is designed for dynamic panel models.22
21Although the presence of endogeneity between reform measures and the accession variable is a possibility,
we believe this concern is mitigated in a few ways: first, any country on the European continent displaying
a modicum of respect for political freedoms and human rights may successfully apply for membership.
Second, not all countries achieved identical institutional quality before finishing the accession process and
subsequently joining. Lastly, within our empirical framework, the accession variable is time-lagged by 5
years, decreasing the likelihood of a feedback loop from reforms to accession.
22The Arellano-Bover / Blundell-Bond estimator performs the forward orthogonal deviations transforma-
tion in order to control for bias arising from the presence of fixed effects in dynamic panel models. In that
sense, it differs from the Difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) estimator which differences the levels
equation to purge fixed effects.
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3.4 Results
Tables 3.3 through 3.6 report estimates from Equations (3.3) through (3.6), respectively.
All specifications with the exception of those in Table 3.6 include country fixed and period
effects.23 The explanatory variables of interest are the EU membership and accession dummy
variables.
In Table 3.3 we report the results for 5-year changes in EFW, KOF, and EBRD scores.
Based on the point estimates from Table 3.3 columns 1-4, being part of the EU is associated
with an increase in a country’s EFW score of between 0.204 and 0.355 points over 5 years.
The sample standard deviation of EFW scores is 1.04 so these point estimates are modest. For
perspective, 0.355 points is less than what separated the 2010 EFW scores of France (7.43)
and the UK (7.91). Indeed, based on that largest point estimate it would take about 15 years
for the cumulative effect on the EFW index to equal one standard deviation. Furthermore,
the estimate reported in column 3 is not statistically significant. The estimated EU accession
effects are likewise underwhelming. Based on the point estimates, being in the accession
process is associated with an increase in a country’s EFW score of between 0.055 and 0.359
points. The column 2 and column 4 estimates are not statistically significant.
Turning to changes in the KOF economic globalization index (columns 5 through 8),
the association with EU membership is never statistically significant. The estimated EU
accession effects are always positive and often (save for column 8 where the CPD government
ideology measure is a control) statistically significant (5 percent level or better). However, the
point estimates (ranging from 2.198 to 4.570) again imply very modest effects. The sample
standard deviation of KOF economic globalization scores is 16.83. Again for perspective,
4.570 points is a good deal less than what separates the 2010 KOF economic globalization
scores of Norway (74.77) and Finland (83.37).
Finally, results based on EBRD score changes are reported in columns 9 through 11.
Neither the EU accession nor EU membership dummy variables enter any of the estimations
statistically significantly. In summary, then, EU accession and EU membership are in many
cases not related statistically significantly to measures of liberalizing economic reforms. Even
23We do not include period effects in the dynamic panel models as our main variables of interest (trends)
are highly correlated with year dummies.
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when the estimated effects are statistically significant, the point estimates are quite modest
in size.
Beyond the control variables of primary interest, the five-year lag of the dependent vari-
able always enters the Table 3.3 estimations negatively and statistically significantly. This
result, then, reflects (i) that there may be diminishing returns to reforms, in the sense that
it is easier to make marginal reforms starting from low levels of policy/institutional quality
than from high levels and (ii) the bounded-from-above nature of the policy/institutional
indices.
Tables 3.4-3.5 report estimates for 5-year convergence in the EFW, KOF, and EBRD
scores to that of the leader country (i.e., highest score). Table 3.4 reports results for
CONV ERGENCE1, while Table 3.5 for CONV ERGENCE2. Based on Table 3.4, EU
membership over 5 years is associated with elimination of the initial EFW gap by between
21.7 and 32.8 percent. We also report statistically significant estimates suggesting that EU
accession is associated with elimination of the EFW gap by between 19.4 and 29.5 percent in
specifications. These are not necessarily large estimated effects, but they are not negligible
either. However, when the CPD government ideology measure is controlled EU accession
does not enter significantly (column 4).
Turning to KOF scores, the EU accession is associated with elimination of the gap by
between 0.5 and 18.6 percent. In the same vein as with the EFW results accession enters
statistically insignificantly when CPD control is introduced although where accession enters
significantly the magnitude of the effect is non-trivial (15.2-18.6 percent). The EU mem-
bership is never significant in the KOF columns while the accession and membership are
likewise unrelated to changes in the EBRD gap.
Based on Table 3.5, EU membership is significantly associated with decreases in the
end-of-period gap relative to the initial EFW gap by 11.3-24.5 percent over 5 years. EU ac-
cession estimates are likewise associated with decreases in the gap but they enter statistically
insignificantly save for DPI column 3 (coefficient = -16.8 percent) in which, alternatively,
membership becomes insignificant (coefficient = -11.3 percent).
Of the 18 countries in the data set that acceded to EU between 1970 and 2010, 13
experienced increases in EFW scores since joining. Those that experienced reversals in
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the EFW scores all joined in 2004 suggesting that, consistent with Table 3.6 results, more
time may be required to elapse after joining before noticeable institutional/policy reform.24
Importantly, the magnitude of EFW reversals is small (0.24 points average drop). The
countries whose EFW scores increased the most since becoming EU members are Ireland
(+1.72 points), UK (+1.98), and Greece (+1.63), which joined in 1973, 1973, and 1981,
respectively.
Recent political tumults in Turkey notwithstanding, the country also experienced a sig-
nificant increase in EFW score (+1.46) since applying for membership in 1987 until 2010.
Though heavily integrated with the EU, the non-members of Switzerland, Norway, and Ice-
land experienced since 1970 positive though relatively small increases in the EFW scores of
0.79 on average (-0.11 average point drop since 1990).
Regarding the KOF scores, we find no evidence that membership is significantly related to
gap decreases; however, accession is related with decreases of between 11.5 and 13.8 percent
except in the CPD column 8. In the EBRD column 9 membership is positively associated
with the size of the gap but this effect disappears once additional controls are introduced.
We hence find no evidence that either membership or accession are significantly related to
this EBRD convergence measure.
Table 3.6 reports the results of the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond regressions based on
Equation (3.4). Here we focus on the relationship between duration of EU membership and
the dependent variable levels while also controlling for the accession dummy. We find that
EU membership duration has an inverse-U relationship with EFW scores. This relationship is
always statistically significant. The negative and statistically significant Y EARS EU term
suggests that the relationship between EFW scores and EU membership is the strongest
during the early years of membership.
Similar to earlier findings, we do not report evidence that membership duration is sig-
nificantly associated with KOF scores, but accession positively and significantly enters the
columns 5 and 7 estimations. Among transition economies we observe a borderline significant
positive effect (p-value 0.116 and 0.103 in columns 10 and 11, respectively) of the length of
membership on EBRD levels. However, we do find the effect of accession dummy on EBRD
24The countries that experienced EFW reversals are Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia.
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to be positive and statistically significant in columns 9, 10, and 11.25
Overall this section provides some empirical evidence suggesting positive relationships
between the EU and liberalizing economic reforms, but those estimated effects are small.
The evidence points to how accession and the jurisdictional competition associated with
EU membership may differently affect liberalizing reforms. While membership seems to be
associated with economic freedom, as indicated by the policies/institutions measured by the
EFW index, accession seems to be associated with the easing of barriers to international
financial and trade flows, as well as an actual increase in those flows. With respect to the
market reforms measured by EBRD scores, in most specifications we do not find that either
membership or accession is significantly associated with improvements among the transition
economies. (When considering the EBRD scores we acknowledge that we are constrained by
limited sample size.)26
An important caveat is that the results are generally sensitive to the choice of government
ideology control. While the two metrics (CPD and DPI) are constructed to measure the same
concept, they differ in terms of the available sample of time periods and countries. The CPD
data run from 1970. (The DPI data runs from 1975.) Also, the CPD data only cover OECD
and some current EU members, omitting countries such as Russia or Ukraine.
3.5 Concluding Discussion
To become a part of EU countries must undergo a process of structural reform and policy
harmonization with the union. Upon joining the EU new members become part of the largest
common market in the world. Goods, services, people, and capital move freely within the EU.
25Note that in the EBRD specifications, the squared term is dropped because the lag of squared
Y EARS EU is identical to linear Y EARS EU , which means they are perfectly collinear.
26We also re-estimated the models in Tables 3.3-3.5 for the EFW and KOF scores to match the 1990-
2010 period as is observed for EBRD specifications. During that period, we find the marginal effects of
membership and accession to be of similar sign, size, and statistical significance. For models using EFW as
the dependent variable, we find the effect of membership on first differences to be positive and significant in 3
out of 4 specifications. Accession’s impact is likewise positive and significant in 2 out of 4 specifications. Both
membership and accession effects are positive and significant in all specifications for CONV ERGENCE1,
and accession effect to be negative and significant in 3 out of 4 specifications for CONV ERGENCE2
(membership significant and negative in all specifications). For the models with KOF globalization index
as the dependent variable, we find no statistical significance for membership, while the accession variable is
consistently significant and of predicted sign in 3 out of 4 specifications regardless of the estimated equation.
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Such an environment may resemble a market-preserving federalism. As such EU countries
may be incentivized by Tiebout competition to offer policy and institutional bundles that
attract/retain their tax base.
In this chapter we investigate whether EU accession and membership have indeed been
associated with changes in policies and institutions that correlate with desirable economic
outcomes (e.g., higher incomes). Based on an unbalanced panel of up to 45 European
countries over the 1970-2010 period, we report that both membership and accession are
either not significantly related to the policy/institutional improvements, or that the related
increases are very modest.
When we report statistically significant results they are mostly regarding the association
between EU membership and the policies/institutions measured by the Fraser Institute’s
economic freedom of the world (EFW) index. In particular, EU membership appears to
be associated positively with changes in a country’s EFW index score; also with measures
of convergence towards the EU leader country. Again, however, the estimated effects are
quite modest. We also report EU accession period is associated with statistically signifi-
cant increases in a country’s KOF economic globalization index scores; also to measures of
convergence to the leader country. Again, the estimated effects are small.
In light of our empirical results, it may be worthwhile to revisit the current debates on
the “usefulness” of EU membership recently highlighted by the “Brexit” referendum. On the
one hand, a significant concern by Eurosceptic voices is that EU law takes precedence over
national law by design, thus suppressing member states own policy-making competencies.
On the other hand, our analysis shows that the mechanisms behind EU membership (and
accession) provide at most a small benefit in terms of institutional improvements relating to
better economic outcomes.
Insofar as these debates persist the consequences of EU membership should be correctly
identified and understood. The results of the chapter highlight one potential trade-off in
never having been a part of, or leaving EU: EU membership is at best associated with small
additional increases as well as convergence in economic freedom scores. (Alternatively, that
EU accession is not/is associated with small additional increases as well as convergence in
economic globalization scores for aspirant countries.)
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Additionally, the results in this chapter relate to the empirical literature finding the
positive effect of EU membership or accession on improved governance quality and market
reform within transition countries. In that sense, existing evidence suggest that EU member-
ship/accession at the very least, did not worsen the institutional quality in countries across
Europe; alternatively, that these mechanisms encouraged modest liberalizing reforms whose
main beneficiaries may ultimately be EU citizens themselves.
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of liberalizing reforms, full sample, 1970-2010.
Table 2.1 Summary statistics of liberalizing reforms, full sample, 1970-2010.
Year Countries Mean Std. Dev. C.o.V. Min Max
EFW chain-linked index
1970 19 6.41 0.94 0.15 3.49 7.59
1975 20 5.85 1.03 0.18 3.72 7.63
1980 22 6.08 1.04 0.17 3.77 8.14
1985 25 6.05 1.16 0.19 3.46 8.30
1990 26 6.41 1.32 0.21 3.55 8.30
1995 35 6.46 1.33 0.20 3.40 8.32
2000 35 7.13 1.01 0.14 4.58 8.76
2005 35 7.40 0.62 0.08 5.74 8.40
2010 35 7.27 0.49 0.06 5.87 8.23
KOF economic globalization index
1970 30 50.15 15.09 0.30 20.26 91.87
1975 30 51.17 15.28 0.29 20.26 92.12
1980 30 54.29 16.59 0.30 20.26 92.31
1985 30 58.19 17.54 0.30 19.04 93.68
1990 33 58.02 18.81 0.32 19.39 94.00
1995 45 60.20 17.02 0.28 30.95 94.38
2000 45 70.06 16.39 0.23 29.84 97.76
2005 45 73.49 14.52 0.19 38.40 95.59
2010 45 75.14 11.55 0.15 51.77 94.69
Average EBRD transition indicator
1990 23 1.38 0.50 0.36 1.00 2.61
1995 23 2.67 0.67 0.25 1.17 3.72
2000 23 3.06 0.64 0.21 1.56 3.89
2005 23 3.35 0.50 0.15 1.89 1.89
2010 24 3.47 0.42 0.12 2.22 4.10
Notes: C.o.V. denotes the coefficient of variation, calculated as the standard deviation
(Std. Dev.) over mean. The EBRD data run from 1990 until 2010 only. For EFW,
maximum scores were observed in Switzerland (1970, 1980, 1990-2000, 2010), Luxem-
bourg (1975, 1985), and Ireland (2005). For KOF, maximum scores were observed in
Luxembourg (1970-2000) and Ireland (2005, 2010). For EBRD, maximum scores were
observed in Poland (1990), Hungary (1995-2000), and Estonia (2005, 2010).
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics for regression subsample.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Chained EFW index (EFW) 19 6.41 0.94 0.15
∆(EFW) 20 5.85 1.03 0.18
CONV ERGENCE1 (EFW) 22 6.08 1.04 0.17
CONV ERGENCE2 (EFW) 25 6.05 1.16 0.19
KOF economic index (KOF) 26 6.41 1.32 8.30
∆(KOF) 35 6.46 1.33 8.32
CONV ERGENCE1 (KOF) 35 7.13 1.01 8.76
CONV ERGENCE2 (KOF) 35 7.40 0.62 8.40
EBRD transition indicator 30 50.15 15.09 91.87
∆(EBRD) 30 51.17 15.28 92.12
CONV ERGENCE1 (EBRD) 30 54.29 16.59 92.31
CONV ERGENCE2 (EBRD) 30 58.19 17.54 93.68
EU membership dummy 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Accession period dummy 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
Years in EU 10.18 15.10 0.00 53.00
NATO membership dummy 0.53 0.49 0.00 1.00
5-year real GDP per cap. growth (%) 15.97 22.27 -60.9 247.23
Log of population 15.83 1.55 12.29 18.81
Polity IV index 7.97 4.30 -9.00 10.00
Gov. ideology (CPD) 2.67 1.49 1.00 5.00
Gov. ideology (DPI) 1.66 1.12 0.00 3.00
Notes: summary statistics based on the model containing maximum available ob-
servations.
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Chapter 4
Integration and Entrepreneurial
Activity in the European Union:
Some Country-Level Evidence
4.1 Introduction
The past decades saw a surge in research on the driving forces behind and the implications
of European Union (EU) integration. The analytical strand of this literature focuses on
the present and future of EU’s federalism and the political economy of integration (e.g.,
Spolaore, 2015; Wyplosz et al., 2015; Bo¨rzel and Hosli, 2003). Empirical studies emerged
more recently with the availability of data. This literature has investigated a wide range of
effects of EU integration such as economic growth/convergence (Ko¨nig, 2015; Mann, 2015;
Campos et al., 2014; Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2008; Kutan and Yigit, 2007; Badinger, 2005),
inequality (Busemeyer and Tober, 2015), and institutional reform (Ugur, 2013; Hall et al.,
2011; Schweickert et al., 2011; Di Tommaso et al., 2007).
This chapter contributes to this growing literature by empirically investigating the im-
pact of EU integration on different measures of entrepreneurial activity within EU member
states in an unbalanced panel of 24 EU countries observed between 2004 and 2012. As en-
trepreneurship is a broad concept, I employ different measures of microfirm (1-9 employees
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in size) formation as well as self-employment rate in the empirical analysis. Business startup
formation is an important barometer of entrepreneurial activity and is essential for fostering
continued dynamism, competition, and innovation in an economy (Klapper et al., 2010). In
that sense, entrepreneurship is an important correlate of economic development and stimu-
lating or facilitating entrepreneurial activity has become one of the foremost economic goals
of policymaking around the world and in the EU itself.
Established at the Treaty of Rome (1957) as a tariff-free zone the EU today resembles
a loose confederation whose de jure sovereign member states share common foreign, trade,
monetary, and certain domestic policies. Along many important dimensions the EU ap-
proaches the United States in terms of depth of connectedness of its constituent states.
Citizens of EU countries are free to cross national borders and work anywhere within the
territory of the union without facing discrimination. Goods, services, capital, and people
flow freely throughout the EU Single Market. Member states benefit from structural and
cohesion funds paid into the common EU Budget. The European Parliament sets EU-wide
legislation while the European Court of Justice adjudicates conflicts and ensures members’
compliance with EU regulation.
Despite EU’s historical prominence, there have been few attempts to quantify the depth
of integration, or institutional and economic cooperation, for this and similar regional ar-
rangements. In this study, I employ the recently developed EU Index (Ko¨nig and Ohr, 2013)
which gauges the EU member states’ degree of economic as well as political integration with
the EU. Higher values of the integration indices signal greater economic interdependence as
well as institutional proximity with the EU relative to and at the expense of with the rest
of the world.
In 2004, 10 new members (eight formerly socialist Eastern European countries along with
Malta and Cyprus) joined the 15-member bloc (EU-15) of Western European countries and
committed to joint institutional evolution as well as free movement of goods, services, labor,
and capital. The subsequent increases in intra-EU trade, FDI flows, and migration brought
about an expansion of member states’ markets and a re-orientation of economic activity from
home toward the largest competitive single market in the world.
Did the deepening of EU integration and the ensuing changes in the economic milieu af-
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fect entrepreneurship within member states? The question appears salient as small business
and self-employment are the largest sources of work for EU labor. On the one hand higher
levels of integration entail greater competition and macroeconomic volatility that pressure
entrepreneurs and small firms to increase efficiency or risk bankruptcy. Along a similar vein,
Melitz (2003) formally models a dynamic industry with heterogeneous firms, and concludes
that opening up to trade forces low productivity firms to exit. On the other hand, a direct
and significant association between EU integration and entrepreneurial measures would be
indicative of the positive effects on entrepreneurial activity stemming from knowledge and
productivity spillovers, as well as expanded opportunities for specialization. An economy
increasingly reliant on the EU’s common market can crowd out smaller firms and depress
expected profits in an increasingly competitive environment. Alternatively, it can provide
an impetus for entrepreneurship by generating knowledge and productivity spillovers aris-
ing from increased cross-national flows of goods, capital, and migration that enterprising
individuals can exploit.
Has the linkage between EU integration and entrepreneurship been operative, and if so,
in which direction? The evidence from country fixed effects regressions indicates that mi-
crofirm levels per capita, as well as microfirm net entry rate, the share of microfirms in total
firms, and self-employment rate generally increase in the levels of EU economic and political
integration. This finding suggests that entrepreneurial learning and opportunities increase
with the depth of EU integration, resulting in faster start-up formation and self-employment.
Existing literature points to potential “pull” (opportunity) factor of globalization that can
influence entrepreneurial individuals to switch to self-employment. In that respect, this chap-
ter provides some preliminary empirical evidence speaking to this assertion, suggesting that,
on net, the “pull” factors outweighed potential crowding-out effects of more intense com-
petition in a larger common market, as well as that encouraging entrepreneurship through
deepened integration and better policies can be an important conduit for improved economic
growth in the EU.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the role of en-
trepreneurship in economic development its relevance to the EU. Section 4.2 examines the
globalization-entrepreneurship nexus and its relation to EU integration. Section 4.4 de-
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scribes data and methodology and section 4.5 presents empirical results. Section 4.6 offers
some concluding remarks.
4.2 Background and Literature Review
Entrepreneurship is widely recognized as a key ingredient of economic progress (Kreft and
Sobel, 2005; Audretsch et al., 2002b). In a Schumpeterian sense, entrepreneurs take risks
and innovate whereby they creatively destroy incumbent technologies and products. Aghion
and Howitt (1992) take stock of these ideas to formally model the process of creative destruc-
tion (vertical innovation) as the underlying source of economic growth. From the Austrian
perspective Kirzner (1997) describes entrepreneurs as alertness agents operating in a dise-
quilibrium environment who discover by trial and error previously unknown arbitrage op-
portunities. These theories argue that entrepreneurs contribute to economic development by
discovering optimal product-market combinations, creating knowledge spillovers, reducing
production costs, stimulating productivity, and increasing competition.
Comparative macro-level studies generally depict a more heterogeneous picture on the
relationship between entrepreneurship and development. Although a positive and significant
effect of the levels of entrepreneurship on productivity, income levels, growth has been well
documented1, differences in defining and measuring standardized entrepreneurial activity
complicate broader cross-country analyses (Van Stel et al., 2005). More recently the consen-
sus shifted toward the notion that the linkage between entrepreneurship and development
is non-linear, and that more developed countries experience higher entrepreneurship levels
(Eeckhout and Jovanovic, 2012; Wennekers et al., 2005; Carree et al., 2002)) but also that
entrepreneurship has a stronger positive effect on development in richer countries (Valliere
and Peterson, 2009; Van Stel et al., 2005).
Against this backdrop, the EU stands out as a particularly interesting case in that it is
a cluster of geographically proximate and sovereign yet highly economically and politically
integrated developed economies with relatively good institutional quality and standardized
1See, e.g., Erken et al., 2016; Carree et al., 2007; Audretsch and Thurik, 2003; Audretsch et al., 2002a. For
U.S. state or county-level analyses, see Wiseman and Young (2013), Goetz et al. (2012), and Sobel (2008).
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regulations. This is of particular importance for empirical studies on entrepreneurship as
its relative definitions vary little within the Union. Furthermore, the relative levels of de-
velopment of EU countries (21 of 24 observed countries are OECD members as of 2012)
along with their relatively sound institutional environment are suggestive of the prevalence
of more productive entrepreneurship (Acs, 2010; Sobel, 2008). Indeed, the importance of
entrepreneurship as a motor for EU’s economies has been recognized by the European Com-
mission (EC), which cites the encouragement of small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs)
as one of its policy goals.2 According to EC, the SMEs comprise 99 percent of all businesses
and account for 85 percent of new jobs in the EU while as many as 37 percent of EU citizens
exhibit preference for self-employment.3,4
A number of empirical studies employ cross-sectional survey data to explore demographic
and cultural determinants of entrepreneurial engagement levels, latent entrepreneurship, and
reported self-employment levels for individuals living in the EU-15 or EU-25 (Grilo and
Thurik, 2008, 2006, 2005a,b; Grilo and Irigoyen, 2006; Verheul et al., 2006). These micro-
level studies generally highlight the perception of administrative complexities and to a lesser
extent the lack of financial support as the main obstacles to starting a business. Freytag
and Thurik (2007) study similar response variables using country-level data. They find that
actual entrepreneurship levels in EU countries cannot be adequately explained with given
data but latent entrepreneurship decreases in countries’ regulatory burden, life expectancy,
and socialist heritage. However, their analysis is also cross-sectional and only concerns the
year 2004.
In this study the focus is on the longitudinal variation in country-level entrepreneurship
proxied primarily by the number of microfirms (1-9 employees) per labor (microfirm density).
The formation of microfirms is indicative of higher entrepreneurial activity within countries,
as these startups are primarily inward-oriented (home as opposed to foreign markets) and
come about as the result of either self-employment (sole proprietorship) or joint venture
(partnership) between few entrepreneurial individuals. In that respect, they may be seen as
2https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/promoting-entrepreneurship/index en.htm
3See, e.g., the EC’s Eurostat (2012) report titled “Entrepreneurship Determinants: Culture and Capa-
bilities.”
4http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/
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the initial conduit in which entrepreneurial activities are conducted (Audretsch et al., 2002b)
and, if successful, may grow in size in the longer-run.5 Because entrepreneurship is a broad
concept, three additional measures are examined to better capture the its essence within
countries: new net microfirm density, the share of microfirms in total firms per country, and
the rate of self-employment.
4.3 Globalization and Entrepreneurship: Theory and
Evidence
The linkage between international economic or political integration (alternatively, globaliza-
tion) and entrepreneurship is a recent area of research (Koster and Karlsson, 2009). Yet
observed trends since the mid-to-late 1970s attest to the accelerated pace of globalization—
expressed through increases in trans-national trade, capital, and labor flows—along with a
simultaneous resurgence of entrepreneurship around the world (Verheul et al., 2002). The in-
dustrial restructuring from managed toward an entrepreneurial economy, in which small firms
command an increasing share of total economic activity, has been even more pronounced in
developed countries (Thurik et al., 2013; Audretsch and Sanders, 2008; Audretsch et al.,
2002a; Carree et al., 2002; Verheul et al., 2002).
The beneficial impact of globalization on economic development is well documented in
the empirical literature (e.g., Dreher, 2006). However, its linkage with entrepreneurship is
not yet well explored. According to the Eclectic Theory of Entrepreneurship, the impact of
globalization can be both positive and negative (Verheul et al., 2002). On the one hand,
increased competition from international markets negatively impacts small firms, either by
crowding them out or creating better opportunities for employee rather than self-employment
positions. On the other, small firms may be better able to absorb macroeconomic variabilities
and adapt to macroeconomic changes in a globalized economy. The observation that the
world is shifting from managed toward entrepreneurial economy is not new. However, only
5Following (Klapper et al., 2010) (p. 131), one may define entrepreneurship as ”the activities of an
individual or a group aimed at initiating economic activities in the formal sector under a legal form of
business.”
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recently has globalization been considered as a major driver of this shift (Audretsch and
Sanders, 2008; Audretsch and Thurik, 2004).
Vinig and De Kluijver (2008), Koster and Karlsson (2009), and more recently Thurik
et al. (2013) take stock of existing research to hypothesize potential channels of linkage from
globalization to entrepreneurship. The main “pull”—or opportunity—factors are identified
as stemming from capital availability, productivity and product knowledge spillovers, ICT
revolution, and cross-border movements of people. As countries open to FDI flows, new
technologies, managerial, and training practices are transferred between countries. Greater
availability of international capital also lowers its cost and provides much needed venture
capital necessary for start-up entrepreneurial activity. Entrepreneurs gain and capitalize on
product knowledge by more easily imitating or complementing imported products. Higher
market volatility and shifts in potential demand due to globalization can also create business
opportunities (or risks) that small firms are better able to exploit and adapt to (Verheul et al.,
2002).
Another important “symptom” of globalization manifests through the presence of multi-
national enterprises (MNEs). Larger MNEs not only introduce new technologies to host
countries but also play a role in encouraging domestic entrepreneurship by providing imita-
tion role models and productivity and knowledge spillovers (Clercq, Hessels, and van Stel
2006). In an illustrative example, McKeon et al. (2004) provide qualitative evidence that
MNEs were an important source of entrepreneurial learning while serving as incubators for
budding entrepreneurs in the Irish IT sector.
In a similar vein, there exists a well-documented history of people learning from employ-
ment at large corporations, subsequently leaving them to form own start-ups (e.g., Steven
Jobs of Apple and Chester Carlsson of Xerox) (Audretsch and Thurik, 2004). Moreover,
recent trends in production reorganization provided opportunities for small firms to arise
to subcontract and act as local suppliers of non-core services for the MNEs (e.g., security,
delivery, catering, cleaning, tailoring, etc.) (Thurik et al., 2013; Verheul et al., 2002).
Greater labor and human mobility in general contributed to knowledge spillovers but
also to increases in demand for variety and exposure to other cultures (Verheul et al., 2002).
The diversification of demand and preference-learning can act encouragingly on potential
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entrepreneurs to fill in emerging market niches. Smaller firms in particular are better able
to adapt to these changes in demand (Verheul et al., 2002).
Despite these descriptive analyses, empirical evidence in this arena is lacking. In a pi-
lot exercise, Vinig and De Kluijver (2008) study the bivariate cross-sectional relationship
between the KOF globalization index and rate of nascent and actual entrepreneurship in a
sample of 30 countries but find no support to the hypothesis that globalization positively
affects entrepreneurship. Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2012) examine the issue from a related
angle, asking how openness and international labor market integration relate to occupational
choice. In a formal model they posit that in high skilled (developed) economies, a dispropor-
tionate share of people switches to managerial positions after integration. Using similar data
as Vinig and De Kluijver (2008) as well as own data on the share of managerial positions
as the dependent variable, they find that globalization and openness positively influence
entrepreneurial activity, especially in richer countries.
In tandem with globalization the EU underwent the process of “Europeanization.” Al-
though the two concepts are closely related, Europeanization—or EU-specific globalization—
is typically considered to be more “intense” in that it entails cooperation with EU at the
expense of third countries. This is not surprising given the perpetual process of institution-
building occurring within the union since its formation. From its beginnings as a free trade
area, the EU had evolved to a customs union, single market, and ultimately a monetary
union by the end of the 20th century. For instance, the process of institutional integra-
tion has been linked with long-run trade deepening between EU member countries (Agur,
Dorrucci, and Mongelli 2007).
The deepening of integration is designated by EU bureaucrats as an ipso facto goal of
making a more “genuine union” (see, e.g., the 2012 Four Presidents Report). Examinations
of the economic impact of EU integration recently gained more traction in the empirical
literature. Notably, Campos, Coricelli, and Moretti (2014) use synthetic counterfactuals
method to find that enlargement countries would have suffered per capita income penalty of
12 percent on average had they not joined the EU. Badinger (2005) finds per capita income
penalty of 20 percent for the EU as a whole had integration not taken place. Several studies
find that EU economic integration enhances growth and convergence of old and new EU
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members alike (Ko¨nig, 2015; Mann, 2015; Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2008).6
Membership in the EU also entails an important political dimension of regional inte-
gration. Upon joining, countries become a part of a political structure resembling market-
preserving federalism (Weingast, 1995). This type of federal structure is characterized by
the existence of multiple layers of government (federal and state) maintaining separate
scopes of authority, with sub-federal governments having primary regulatory control over
own economies. These “sub-federal jurisdictions,” or in this case EU member states, co-
exist in a common market in which they are unable to new erect trade or capital barriers
with other members or have access to unlimited credit and printing presses.
The economic consequences of market-preserving federalism are well documented in the
public finance literature (e.g., Tiebout, 1956). The presence of a common market of unre-
stricted mobility along with the independence of sub-federal jurisdictions ensures that these
jurisdictions compete for capital and labor by providing bundles of new public policies and
services. Accordingly, institutional quality within EU member states is subject to pressures
to improve over time in order to attract economic activity or suffer losses.
However, for a given level of institutional quality once a country joins EU, further deep-
ening of integration is indicative of de facto increases in economic activity between member
states stemming from their increased reliance on the common market. With higher levels
of integration, the extent of the market expands within member states as their economies
re-orient from home toward the common market. In a Smithian vein, this expansion of the
market creates new opportunities for specialization and division of labor that entrepreneurial
individuals can exploit.
No empirical study to my knowledge tests how integration relates to entrepreneurship in
the EU. Increasing levels of self-employed population and formation of microfirms over time
are indicative of a more entrepreneurial and more dynamic economy, all else equal. Micro
firms comprise between 69 and 97 percent of total businesses (average of around 90 percent)
while the self-employment rates range from 6 to nearly 37 percent (average 16 percent) in
largest regression subsamples in this chapter. The economic activity of the self-employed is
typically conducted via these microfirms, and their effect on generating future employment
6See Badinger and Breuss (2011) for an exhaustive review of quantitative effects of EU integration.
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and growth is recognized in most recent studies at least among more developed countries
(Erken et al., 2016; Thurik et al., 2008; Carree et al., 2007).7 Empirical evidence on the
topic can help illuminate the effects on entrepreneurship levels as the EU turns inward
economically and further integrates institutionally.
4.4 Data and Methodology
The primary unit of measurement for entrepreneurial activity used in this chapter is the size
of the private startup (microfirm) sector scaled by the size of the labor force, or microfirm
density. Micro firms, defined as enterprises employing between 1 and 9 employees, are
typically formed through either self-employment (sole proprietorship) or joint venture (part-
nership) between few entrepreneurial individuals. In that regard, increases in entrepreneurial
activity on the margin and over the shorter-run can be initially seen, all else equal, through
increased presence of startups as these microfirms are typically at the starting point for en-
trepreneurial individuals seeking to be own employer. Data on microfirms are obtained from
OECD Structural and Demographic Business Statistics database.8
As additional robustness checks, three additional measures are considered: (i) the net
entry of microfirms per labor (new net microfirm density), (ii) the share of microfirms in
the number of total firms in the economy, and (iii) self-employment rate. The World Bank
defines self-employed workers as “those workers who, working on their own account or with
one or a few partners or in cooperative, hold the type of jobs defined as a ‘self-employment
jobs,’ i.e., jobs where the remuneration is directly dependent upon the profits derived from
the goods and services produced.”
Data from observed samples show that EU countries did exhibit structural shifts over time
toward a more entrepreneurial economy. Simple unreported bivariate regressions against a
7In an earlier study, Blanchflower (2000) finds that increases in self-employment do not significantly
impact growth in OECD countries. However, as Carree and Thurik (2010) point out, his study may be
subject to inconsistencies as it uses data of low cross-country comparability.
8In general, OECD defines an enterprise as “a legal entity possessing the right to conduct business on
its own; for example, to enter into contracts, own property, incur liabilities for debts, and establish bank
accounts. It may consist of one or more local units or establishments corresponding to production units
situated in a geographically separate place and in which one or more persons work for the enterprise to
which they belong.”
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time trend and country fixed effects report that, on average, the number of microfirms
per labor has been increasing at a pace of 4 percentage points per year, and the share of
microfirms in total firms by 0.5 percent on average within countries per year between 2004 and
2012. The total number of firms per labor has been rising at a pace of 3.6 percent per year.
Appendix Figure 4.1 depicts the average share of microfirms for 24 EU countries between
2004 and 2012. During this period, Greece had the highest average share of microfirms in
total number of business in the EU (96.4 percent), while Slovak Republic had the lowest
(80.6 percent).
The main explanatory variables of interest are the two components of the EU index
developed by Ko¨nig and Ohr (2013). The two indices, the single market and institutional
conformity index, respectively measure the depth of economic and political integration with
the EU for each member country. The single market index captures the extent to which
an EU country relies on the EU Single Market. It combines four indicators of economic
integration: the sum of intra-EU imports and exports, inward and outward EU capital
(FDI) stock, and (inward) European workers both as the share of the total trade, FDI stock,
and foreign employees, as well as GDP and total number of employees.9
The institutional conformity (political integration) index captures membership in the
Schengen zone (no passport/border checkpoints between EU countries) and monetary union,
and the countries’ compliance with EU law in the fields of environment and consumer pro-
tection, single market compliance, and other sectors. The value of the index increases in the
“quantity” of compliance, as well as EMU and Schengen Zone participation. The authors
use principal component analysis to calculate the weights of the integration indices that each
range from 0 to the maximum of 100.
The single market indicator closely relates to economic globalization and serves as the
share of economic activity conducted with the EU single market as opposed to home or world
markets. The distinction is salient given that re-orientation of economic activity toward the
single market implies even greater exposure to competition as the common market means EU
countries are unable to impose trade and other barriers on other members by virtue of their
9Intra-EU here refers to the EU-14, the cluster of 14 “old” and more developed Western EU members
that joined by 1995 (except Luxembourg).
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EU membership. The focus on only the microfirms also mitigates concerns of a feedback
loop as these startups primarily operate domestically (they are least likely to compete on
the single market) rather than internationally. In that vein, while microfirms are unlikely
to themselves influence the extent of trade, capital, and migration flows with the EU Single
Market, they are more likely be affected by the changes in the economic environment brought
about by economic integration with the EU.
At higher levels of the economic integration index, a member state’s economic activity
becomes more concentrated on the EU single market relative to domestic and world mar-
kets. Greater economic interdependence with the EU expands the size of home markets
and can provide opportunities for entrepreneurial learning and specialization, but it also
generates greater competitive pressures that crowd out low-efficiency firms and diminish ex-
pected profits. Higher shares of EU employees in domestic labor force stimulates demand
for variety at home (e.g., ethnic restaurants), and also drives up general demand as EU im-
migrants tend to also bring their families when settling in other EU countries. Furthermore,
immigrants bring new business practices and ideas and, down the line, themselves increase
entrepreneurial supply in the host country (Baycan-Levent and Nijkamp, 2005).
Thus far, the discussion has mostly focused on the economic aspect of EU integration;
however, an equally important dimension lies in countries’ institutional conformity with
the EU. The institutional conformity (political) index of EU integration increases in the
intensity of EU member’s participation in the Schengen zone and monetary union, as well
as when a country exhibits better compliance with EU law. The Schengen zone is the
EU’s area of checkpoint-free travel between member countries. The removal of passport
requirements and border checkpoints facilitates transportation, business travel, and tourism
within the territory of the zone, potentially increasing demand for variety and profitability
of entrepreneurial opportunities.
The adoption of euro as the official currency and joining the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) can reduce transaction costs of operating a business and lowers exchange
and interest rate uncertainty making start-up capital acquisition at home or from abroad
less costly. Additionally, institutional conformity signals compliance with various EU regula-
tions that serve to protect consumers and businesses alike from unfair competition practices,
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intellectual property theft, state favoritism of certain firms, as well as other tortious acts.
To test the relationship between EU integration and startup prevalence in 24 EU countries
between 2004 and 2012, I estimate the following econometric model:
ln(
MICROi,t
LABORi,t
) = α + β1SMKTi,t + β2POLi,t + θX
′ + νi + δt + ui,t (4.1)
where MICRO denotes the number of enterprises 1-9 employees in size and LABOR is labor
force size (World Bank WDI). The variable SMKT is the economic integration index, POL
denotes political integration, X is the vector of control variables, is the country-specific fixed
effect, are the year fixed effects, and is the idiosyncratic error term. Equation (4.1) speaks
directly to the relationship between economic and political integration on the one hand, and
the growth of the private sector in the domain of micro or startup firms. Controlling for
covariates, positive and statistically significant coefficients and are suggestive of integration
contributing toward industrial restructuring toward an entrepreneurial economy within EU
member countries.
Literature points to the importance of demographic, economic, and institutional factors
as determinants of country-level entrepreneurial activity.10 Remaining independent variables
control for a range of country-level characteristics such as relative levels of development (log
of real GDP per capita, World Bank WDI), unemployment rate (World Bank WDI, ILO
estimate), institutional quality (the composite Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the
World Index)11, secondary and tertiary education attainment levels (percentage of working-
age population, CEPII Institute), population density (people per square kilometer of land
area, World Bank WDI), percentage of urban population (World Bank WDI), and labor
force participation rate for ages 15+ (World Bank WDI).
To the extent that entrepreneurial culture matters for entrepreneurship (see, e.g., Wen-
nekers et al., 2007), it will be absorbed in the country-specific fixed effect as cultural attitudes
10See, e.g., Sambharya and Musteen (2014), Bjørnskov and Foss (2008), Nystro¨m (2008), Verheul et al.
(2002).
11The composite index ranges from 0 to 10 and is increasing in the quality of institutions proxied by the
five dimensions: (i) size of government, (ii) legal structure and property rights security, (iii) access to sound
money, (iv) freedom to trade internationally, and (v) regulation of credit, labor, and business. The Economic
Freedom of the World (EFW) (Gwartney et al., 2016) index has been cited in hundreds of scholarly studies
that find a positive correlation between EFW and various “good” socio-economic outcomes.
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can be considered largely time-invariant over shorter periods for most prominent indicators
of national culture (e.g., Schwartz, Hofstede). Other time-invariant determinants of en-
trepreneurship such as historical circumstances, geography, post-socialist heritage, and legal
systems are likewise controlled for by this method. Appendix Table 4.1 reports summary
statistics for all variables included in the empirical analysis.
Countries included in the empirical analysis comprise all EU countries that joined by
2004 except Luxembourg which contains many extreme values and is therefore omitted from
the calculations of the index (Ko¨nig and Ohr, 2013). The included countries are: Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Three most recent EU members Bulgaria
(2007), Romania (2007), and Croatia (2013) are likewise excluded.
4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Main Estimates
Appendix Table 4.2 reports Equation (4.1) parameter estimates. The dependent variable is
the natural log of microfirms per capita. All estimates are obtained using country and year
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level.
Empirical results from the several specifications in Table 4.2 suggest that microfirm den-
sity increases in the levels of single market (economic) and political integration, although
the coefficient of political integration becomes statistically significant only in the full-controls
model. For a unit increase in single market integration, the number of microfirms per capita
rises by 1.6 percentage points within countries on average, and by 0.6 percentage points for
a unit increase in political integration, all else equal. For a one standard deviation increase
in single market integration index (about 10 index points) microfirm density increases by
about 16 percentage points. Concurrently, for a one standard deviation increase in political
integration (about 12 index point), microfirm density increases by 7.2 percentage points.
The baseline results suggest that EU integration has had a non-negligible impact on
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promoting the shift towards an entrepreneurial economy. Controlling for the economic, de-
mographic, and institutional context, the expansion of economic and institutional proximity
with EU positively affects the prevalence of microfirms in an EU economy. This finding sug-
gests that the positive effects of integration due to potential productivity, knowledge, and
technology spillovers as well as migration have, on net, outweighed potential crowding-out
effects of more intense competition in a larger common market. Consequently, promoting
openness as well as membership in common markets and monetary unions could prove useful
from a policy standpoint in encouraging domestic startup creation.
4.5.2 Robustness Checks
To further test the validity of existing results, three additional models are estimated in Table
4.2:
ln(
∆MICROi,t
LABORi,t
) = α + β1SMKTi,t + β2POLi,t + θX
′ + νi + δt + ui,t (4.2)
MICROi,t
TOTALi,t
= α + β1SMKTi,t + β2POLi,t + θX
′ + νi + δt + ui,t (4.3)
SELFLi,t = α + β1SMKTi,t + β2POLi,t + θX
′ + νi + δt + ui,t (4.4)
where TOTAL is the total number of firms in a country (OECD), and SELF is the self-
employment rate (World Bank WDI). Equation (4.2) examines whether and how EU inte-
gration affected the net entry rate of micro firms per labor.12 Equation (4.3) studies how the
share (percentage) of microfirms in total number of firms per country changes in the levels
of integration, while Equation (4.4) examines self-employment rate as another indicator for
entrepreneurship.
Results from Table 4.3 report that increases in single market integration are positively
associated at statistically usual levels with net entry rate of microfirms per labor, share
of microfirms in total number of firms in the economy, and the rate of self-employment.
12Because ln(x) is defined only for when x > 0, this specification considers only the years in which the
net entry of microfirms was positive overall. Positive effect of integration indices would indicate that this
positive net entry is even faster with higher integration. Using only the ratio first-difference (can be negative
or positive) of microfirms to labor force, no significant results are obtained.
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For a unit increase in the single market integration index, net new density (net entry rate)
increases by 7.4 percent. Additionally, the share of microfirms in total firms increases by
about quarter-percent while self-employment rate by a one-tenth of one percent for a unit
increase in the single market integration index. For a one standard deviation increase in
single market integration index (about 10 index points), net entry increases by as much as
74 percent. Moreover, the share of microfirms in total firms increases by 2.3 percent while
self-employment rate increases by about 1 percentage point, which is a modest effect.
With respect to political integration, results are statistically significant in all but spec-
ification (2). Results suggest that unit increases in political integration are statistically
significantly associated with a 3.5 percent increase in net new density and only 0.05 percent
increases in self-employment rates. For one standard deviation increase in political integra-
tion (about 12 index point), net new density is higher by 42 percent and self-employment
by 0.6 percent, again a modest effect. However, increases in both economic and political
integration increased by one standard deviation would be associated with about 1.6 per-
cent increase in self-employment rate, a quarter of its standard deviation and a non-trivial
increase.
Overall, the results from this and the preceding section present some preliminary evi-
dence in favor of the hypothesis that economic integration and ensuing changes in economic
circumstances help foster a climate suitable for entrepreneurship. The results point to the
existence of positive spillovers on potential entrepreneurs arising from deepening of economic
cooperation with the EU in terms of trade, capital flows, and intra-European migration. In
addition to economic, political integration also positively correlates with entrepreneurship
measures. This finding suggests that the erasure of border checkpoints throughout EU,
the adoption of euro, and better compliance with EU single market laws may provide an
entrepreneurial incentive through better macroeconomic stability, lower transactions costs,
more tourism, and adherence to EU competitive legislation.
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4.6 Concluding Remarks
In 2004, 10 new countries joined the EU’s common market and committed to joint institu-
tional evolution of the 25-member bloc. EU membership and integration have been shown in
the empirical literature to positively affect economic development and institutional quality
within member countries. However, the impact of the changing economic and institutional
landscape on the entrepreneurship levels, an important correlate of development, has not
been explored as of yet.
A globalizing economy can crowd out small firms and depress expected profits in an
increasingly competitive environment. Alternatively, it can provide an impetus for en-
trepreneurship by generating knowledge and productivity spillovers arising from increased
cross-national flows of goods, capital, and migration that enterprising individuals can exploit.
Has the linkage between globalization/regional integration and entrepreneurship been oper-
ative, and if so, in which direction? To provide a preliminary answer to this question, this
chapter examines how EU integration, or EU-specific globalization, affected the prevalence
of business startups and self-employment rate within its member states.
This chapter explores whether and how might EU economic and political integration have
have affected the prevalence of microfirms and self-employment within member countries
between 2004 and 2012. Entrepreneurial activity is proxied by the rates of self-employment,
density of microfirms (1-9 employees) per labor, (net) entry rate of microfirms per labor, and
share of microfirm startups in total number of firms in the economy. The main finding is
that single market integration—expressed through greater intra-EU flows of goods, capital,
and people as the share of national economy—is significantly and positively associated with
the above measures of entrepreneurship. Similar results are found for political integration,
although I find non-association between political integration and the share of microfirms
in total number of firms within a country. These results provide preliminary empirical
evidence in favor of the conjecture of positive effects of regional (i.e., European) integration
on industrial restructuring toward an entrepreneurial economy across the world.
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4.7 Appendix
Figure 4.1: Average share of micro firms in total number of firms per country, 2004-2012.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for regression subsample variables.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Share of micro firms in total number of firms (%) 90.54 5.13 69.75 97.43
(Log) micro firm density -2.686 0.447 -3.855 -1.853
(Log) new net micro firm density -6.219 1.145 -10.536 -3.134
Single market integration 40.92 10.29 21.68 75.88
Political integration 77.36 11.76 46.78 97.95
Real GDP per capita (USD) $26,557 $13,526 $7,634 $50,695
Labor force participation rate (%) 58.67 4.70 48.10 71.1
Unemployment rate (%) 8.61 4.00 2.80 25.20
Population density 165.11 209.33 17.16 1310.80
Urban population (%) 72.64 11.54 49.85 97.73
Secondary education (%) 82.90 11.47 45.90 97.68
Tertiary education (%) 20.21 6.42 10.07 32.07
EFW index 7.47 0.35 6.55 8.40
Self-employment (% of total employed) 15.91 6.18 7.9 36.6
Notes: summary statistics calculated from table 2 specification (3) and specification (4) (only for
self-employment rate).
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Table 4.2: Fixed effects regressions of micro firm density on EU economic and political
integration indices for 24 EU countries, 2004-2012.
Dep. Var.: Log Micro Firm Density (1) (2) (3)
Single market integration 0.024* 0.024* 0.016*
(0.013) (0.012) (0.009)
Political integration 0.007 0.006 0.006*
(0.006) (.004) (0.004)
Unemployment rate 0.002 0.025
(0.012) (0.017)
Population density -0.004 0.004
(0.007) (0.006)
Urban population share -0.052 -0.001
(0.075) (0.036)
Labor force participation rate -0.033 -0.039
(0.021) (0.024)
(Log) real GDP per capita 2.940*
(1.525)
Secondary education (%) -0.029
(0.025)
Tertiary education (%) -0.028
(0.031)
Economic Freedom (EFW) index -0.595*
(0.303)
Observations 206 206 205
Countries 24 24 24
R2 0.28 0.31 0.44
Notes: standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the country-level. All
specifications include country and year fixed effects. Specifications (1) and
(2) additionally control for the number of remaining firms in the economy.
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The purpose of this dissertation was to better understand the factors contributing to in-
stitutional change across countries, as well as to uncover the economic consequences of
cross-national economic and political integration. To this end, the three empirical essays
presented herein focus largely on the countries of the European continent.
The reasons for this European focus are two-fold. First, the European Union stands
as one of the most prominent examples in regional integration, whereby 500 million people
across 28 countries share a common market and commit to join institutional evolution. The
socio-economic effects of regional integration have recently re-entered the policy spotlight as
evidenced by the ongoing Eurozone crisis and the “Brexit” referendum.
Second, the post-communist economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia provided
unprecedented insights into the issues concerning institutional change. Addressing the factors
driving institutional transition towards free markets and private property, I hypothesize that
culture had a significant moderating influence on the effectiveness of democratization in
promoting the adoption of market-based reforms in these countries.
In Chapter 2, I examine cultural orientations, based on (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2001;
Hofstede, 1980) typologies, and their interplay with political liberalization in promoting
market reforms over the 1989-2001, in the immediate aftermath of communism’s collapse.
The main finding is that a sense of individualism and intolerance for inherently unequal
power hierarchies improved the effectiveness of democracy, suggesting that democratization
in societies strongly fostering these sentiments enhanced reform efforts in these countries.
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This finding is robust to a number of additional controls, including an IV specification that
treats democracy as endogenous and instruments for domestic democracy by a weighted
average of a country’s neighboring democracy levels.
Chapter 3 looks at the entirety of the European continent and studies the impact of
EU integration on the long-run institutional convergence among the countries of Europe
between 1970 and 2010. The two mechanisms of EU integration—the accession process and
the membership stage—may promote institutional improvement via institutional anchoring
in the pre-membership stage, and Tiebout-like competition in the membership stage. This
chapter finds that there exists a small (though often statistically insignificant) positive effect
of joining EU on the promotion the institutions of economic freedom, consistent with the
hypothesis of inter-jurisdictional competition existing within the EU’s common market; also,
of liberalizing reform implementation as a conditioning mechanism of EU membership.
Chapter 4 examines how the deepening of economic and political integration affected
industrial restructuring within 24 EU member states between 2004 and 2012. Drawing from
recent literature that highlights the forces of globalization as important drivers of the switch
to an entrepreneurial economy, I ask whether European regional integration contributed to
the increases in microfirm and self-employment prevalence over the observed period. The
chapter provides suggestive evidence that the deepening of EU member countries’ reliance
on the largest competitive common market in the world, rather than suppressed it, spurred
entrepreneurial activity, an important correlate of economic development, by encouraging
entrepreneurial learning, innovation, and attitudes.
The contributions of this dissertation call attention to the challenges associated with
institutional improvement across countries, as well as the issues concerning the costs and
benefits of EU integration. Findings suggest that regional integration creates the environ-
ment for faster economic institutional reform, encourages industrial restructuring towards an
entrepreneurial-based economy, and that the underlying culture must be taken into account
when considering the impact of political liberalization on institutional change.
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